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INTRODUCTION 
In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle remarked that behavior that is 
“unjust . . . becomes more unjust as it is practised on closer friends. It is 
more shocking, e.g., to rob a companion of money than to rob a fellow-
citizen, to fail to help a brother than a stranger, and to strike one’s father 
than anyone else.”1 Modern society appears to have taken the opposite 
view: violent behavior directed towards strangers is perceived as more 
serious than violent behavior between two individuals who have an 
existing relationship. While violence between intimates is seen as an 
essentially unavoidable by-product of personal relationships, violence 
between strangers has been portrayed as a random act by predators who 
threaten society at large. 
The significant increase in population and urbanization in modern 
times has undoubtedly given rise to more situations where strangers 
interact, and thus more opportunities for stranger violence. Yet even today, 
the majority of violent crimes are committed by people who know their 
victims. Between 1998 and 2002, for example, 54% of all violent crimes 
occurred between non-strangers.2 And for certain types of violent crimes, 
 
 
 1. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 224–25 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985) (“What is just is 
also different, since it is not the same for parents towards children as for one brother towards another, 
and not the same for companions as for fellow-citizens, and similarly with the other types of 
friendship. Similarly, what is unjust towards each of these is also different, and becomes more unjust 
as it is practised on closer friends. It is more shocking, e.g., to rob a companion of money than to rob a 
fellow-citizen, to fail to help a brother than a stranger, and to strike one’s father than anyone else. 
What is just also naturally increases with friendship, since it involves the same people and extends 
over an equal area.”). 
 2. In 2005, the majority of violent crimes, 51.77%, were committed by non-strangers. See 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 9 tbl.9 (2005), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv05.pdf [hereinafter CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 
2005]. This figure appears to have remained relatively stable over time. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF 
JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY’S COURTS 19 
(1977) (1970s study of felony arrests in New York City; 56% of all charged violent felonies involved 
some prior relationship between the offender and victim). However, some years the overall 
victimization rates of strangers are slightly higher than the victimization rates for non-strangers. See 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1993 30 (1993), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus933.pdf (“Fifty-three 
percent of all violent victimizations, 28% of rapes, 81% of robberies, and 50% of assaults were 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
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the percentage committed by non-strangers is much higher. In 2004, only 
23% of murders3 and approximately 30% of sexual assaults were 
committed by strangers.4 Robbery is the only category of violent crime 
consistently committed more often by a stranger rather than by someone 
known to the victim.5 
The specter of violence at the hands of a stranger dominates the 
modern construction of crime.6 Despite the higher rate of non-stranger 
violence, respondents to a recent poll indicated a belief that they were 
significantly more likely to be shot or badly hurt by a stranger than hit by 
their spouse or partner.7 Criminal law commentators have long remarked 
 
 
committed by strangers in 1993.”) [hereinafter CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1993]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995 34 
(1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus9503.pdf (stating that 51% of all 
violent crimes that occurred in 1995 were committed by a stranger) [hereinafter CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION 1995]. 
 3. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004 UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS 18–23 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/documents/CIUS2004.pdf. 
 4. “[S]even in ten female rape or sexual assault victims stated the offender was an intimate, 
other relative, a friend or an acquaintance.” BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CRIME CHARACTERISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict_c.htm (last visited June 13, 2006). 
 5. “Robbery was the offense most often committed by strangers; 77 percent of the robbery 
victimizations were committed by strangers.” MARC RIEDEL, STRANGER VIOLENCE: A THEORETICAL 
INQUIRY 64 (1993) (citing victimization surveys from 1982 to 1984); see also CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION 2005, supra note 2, at 9 tbl.9 (indicating that 66% of robberies in 2005 were 
committed by strangers); VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 19 (1970s study of felony arrests in 
New York City; 64% of all charged robberies were committed by strangers); F.E. Zimring & J. Zuehl, 
Victim Injury and Death in Urban Robbery: A Chicago Study, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1986) (reporting 
that 87% of robberies in Chicago in 1986 were committed by strangers). 
 6. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 71 (1998) (“[F[ear of crime is 
associated with a burglary, robbery, rape, or assault perpetrated by a stranger. Fear of strangers, in 
short, helps generate the fear of crime.”); Joachim Kersten, Crime and Masculinities in Australia, 
Germany and Japan, 8 INT’L SOC. 461, 461 (1993) (“Perpetrators of offences that fit into stereotypical 
images of ‘stranger-danger’ appear to be at the basis of crime debates, regardless of evidence 
indicating that most reported and (with some likelihood) most unreported attacks, occur between 
people who know each other.”); Marc Reidel, Stranger Violence: Perspectives, Issues, and Problems, 
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 223, 223–24 (1987) (noting previous commentators “have argued that 
the fear of crime is basically a fear of strangers”); Leonore M.J. Simon, Sex Offender Legislation and 
the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 485, 487 (1999) (“The fear of the stranger 
fuels the majority of criminal legislation . . . .”); see also U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 52–
53 (1967) [hereinafter CHALLENGE OF CRIME] (“[T]he fear of crimes of violence is not a simple fear of 
injury or death or even of all crimes of violence, but, at bottom, a fear of strangers.”); V. Edwin 
Bixenstine, Spousal Homicide, in LETHAL VIOLENCE: A SOURCEBOOK ON FATAL DOMESTIC, 
ACQUAINTANCE AND STRANGER VIOLENCE 231, 231 (Harold V. Hall ed., 1999) (“Among violent 
crimes, homicide is rare. Intuitively, it strikes us as . . . the actions of a menacing stranger.”). 
 7. The poll, which was conducted in October, 1998, asked respondents to rate the likelihood of 
a series of incidents happening to them. When asked about the likelihood of being shot or badly hurt 
by a stranger, 8% responded very likely, 30% said somewhat likely, 40% said not likely, and 18% 
thought there was no chance it would occur. When asked about the likelihood of being hit by their 
spouse or partner, 6% responded very likely, 8% said somewhat likely, 24% said not likely, and 58% 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that violent crimes committed by strangers are more likely to lead to an 
arrest, result in a conviction, and garner a longer sentence than comparable 
crimes committed by family or acquaintances. Well-publicized studies of 
capital sentencing decisions have consistently demonstrated that offenders 
who murder strangers are significantly more likely to receive the death 
penalty than offenders who murder people they already know.8 The idea 
that crimes between strangers are more serious than crimes between those 
who already know each other has been repeated so often9 that it has 
become the conventional wisdom in criminal law. 
Many previous publications have discussed the relative lack of priority 
accorded to violent crimes that occur in domestic or other intimate 
relationships.10 This Article examines whether the modern view of 
stranger violence as more serious crime than violence that occurs in any 
relationship where the victim and offender already know one another—
including violence between intimates and family members, as well as 
violence between friends and acquaintances—can be justified. 
For ease of reference, this Article collectively refers to violent acts 
committed by intimates, family members, friends, and acquaintances as 
“non-stranger violence.” This definitional decision does not reflect a 
judgment that criminal justice decision makers treat all non-stranger 
violence alike. To the contrary, the available data suggest that most people 
perceive that the seriousness of crime is inversely related to the closeness 
of the personal relationship—that is to say, violence between intimates and 
 
 
thought there was no chance it would occur. PollingReport, Misc. HealthCare Issues, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/health.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
 Nor does the disproportionate fear of strangers appear to be a new phenomenon. See Robert J. 
Sampson, Personal Violence By Strangers: An Extension and Test of the Opportunity Model of 
Predatory Victimization, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 327, 327–28 (1987) (“[I]t is the possibility of 
attack by strangers that seems to engender the most intense feelings of vulnerability and fear. . . . [T]he 
general public tends to ‘equate strange with dangerous,’ thereby rating victimization by strangers as 
one of the most serious and pressing crime problems.” (quoting C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8 (1978))). 
 8. See infra note 32. 
 9. As Gottfredson and Gottfredson put it: 
Nearly every decision-maker in the [criminal justice] process seeks alternatives [to 
prosecution] for criminal acts between relatives, friends and acquaintances. The most grave 
dispositions are reserved continuously for events between strangers. Victims report non-
stranger events less frequently, police arrest less frequently, prosecutors charge less 
frequently, and so on through the system. 
MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & DON M. GOTTFREDSON, DECISION-MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 331 (1st ed. 1980). For further examples of such 
statements, see DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 40 (1976); RIEDEL, supra note 5, at 14; 
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 65; Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial 
Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 701 (2006). 
 10. See infra notes 64–67. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
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family members is treated as least serious. Nor is the “non-stranger” 
terminology meant to imply that the arguments about whether non-
stranger violence should be treated as seriously as stranger violence are 
unaffected by the type of relationship between the victim and the offender. 
(In fact, several of the arguments in Part III apply only to close personal 
relationships.) This Article uses the term “non-stranger” because many of 
the arguments in support of treating stranger violence more seriously are 
based on specific assumptions unique to strangers, and it is this unique 
treatment of stranger crime that this Article ultimately seeks to 
challenge.11 Assumptions about culpability, dangerousness, and victim 
fault may differ with respect to different non-stranger relationships, and 
this Article endeavors to note where these differences affect any 
conclusions about the justification of treating stranger violence as more 
serious. 
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the commentary and studies 
that have examined the effect of victim-offender relationships on criminal 
justice decision making. It also notes instances where the treatment of 
stranger violence as more serious crime than comparable non-stranger 
violence has been codified in statutes or other written regulations. 
Possible justifications for the prioritization of stranger violence over 
non-stranger violence are explored in Part II. Those justifications include 
(a) a perception that stranger offenders are more culpable than non-
stranger offenders; (b) a perception that stranger offenders are more 
dangerous than non-stranger offenders; (c) a belief that the non-stranger 
victims are at least partially at fault for the offenders’ actions; (d) a belief 
that non-stranger violence is best resolved as a private or non-criminal 
matter; and (e) fear and general public concern caused by stranger crime. 
This Part examines the empirical evidence that supports and contradicts 
each explanation, as well as the soundness of each justification for 
differentiating between offenders who are similar in all respects except for 
whether they knew their victims prior to the offenses. 
Part III makes the affirmative case for according non-stranger violence 
the same level of priority as stranger violence by identifying three 
 
 
 11. For a summary of evidence suggesting that the underenforcement of violent crimes has 
historically been more pronounced for all non-stranger violence (including both domestic and other 
personal relationships) than for stranger violence, see LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS 37–38 (1992) (describing one commentator’s observations 
of Los Angeles in the early 1970s of “a general pattern of police inaction in the face of violence 
stemming from any kind of personal dispute, not just domestic” and discussing a 1977 study finding 
that “where the suspect and victim were strangers, police failed to make arrests in 66% of the cases 
(compared to 83% of cases where the parties were acquainted)”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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arguments that suggest non-stranger crime is more serious than stranger 
crime. Drawing on the role of victim harm in criminal liability and 
sentencing decisions, it argues that the prioritization of violent crimes 
committed by strangers ignores the unique harms associated with non-
stranger violence, such as increased victim injuries and breach of trust. 
Violence within personal relationships is also distinct from stranger 
violence in that a non-stranger offender violates not only the ordinary duty 
of one citizen not to physically harm another, but also the additional 
obligations and duties associated with many close social relationships. 
This Part briefly outlines the various positive obligations that the law 
imposes in close personal relationships, and it concludes that in 
prioritizing violence by strangers, the criminal law is inconsistent with 
other areas of law. The final affirmative argument in favor of equal 
prioritization of stranger and non-stranger violence is an argument about 
the interplay of criminal law and social norms: in treating stranger 
violence as more serious than non-stranger violence, the criminal justice 
system reinforces the questionable notion that violence is an unavoidable, 
and thus potentially excusable, aspect of personal relationships. 
The final Part of this Article briefly sketches my conclusions and their 
implications, explaining that my conclusions do not necessarily require 
more severe treatment of non-stranger violence, but indicate that non-
stranger violence should receive equal treatment to stranger violence. This 
Part also notes that the two types of crime differ in some practical 
respects, and those differences must be considered in setting crime 
prevention and enforcement policies. Ultimately, the most effective 
prevention and enforcement techniques for non-stranger violence may 
require changing the public perception of non-stranger violence as less 
serious than stranger violence. The last several decades have already seen 
significant changes in public attitudes towards the seriousness of domestic 
violence and acquaintance rape.12 But even today stranger violence 
continues to garner a disproportionate amount of public attention and 
criminal justice resources. If, as this Article concludes, the more serious 
treatment of stranger violence cannot be justified, then public attitudes 
toward non-stranger violence require further change. 
 
 
 12. See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 320 (2000) (noting 
“evolving public attitudes toward acquaintance rape”); George C. Thomas III, A Critique of the Anti-
Pornography Syllogism, 52 MD. L. REV. 122, 133 (1993) (discussing a “change in attitude” toward 
acquaintance rape); see also infra note 231. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
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I. EVIDENCE OF THE PRIORITIZATION OF STRANGER ABOVE NON-
STRANGER CRIME IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Many criminal law commentators have remarked on the criminal 
justice system’s different treatment of stranger crime and non-stranger 
crime.13 The prevailing view among commentators is that the criminal law 
is most likely to become involved, to proceed aggressively, and to be 
penal in style when the parties are strangers; it is least likely to become 
involved and most likely to be lenient and conciliatory when they are 
intimates.14 As one criminal law commentator explained, the existence of 
a preexisting relationship between the offender and the victim is one factor 
prosecutors use to distinguish between “real” and “technical” crimes: 
This “relationship” can take many forms, as the crime might occur 
between people who are strangers, acquaintances, friends, family 
members, or lovers. Relationships are thus defined by the degree of 
intimacy that existed between the parties prior to the crime in 
question. Much of the available literature suggests that as the 
relationship between the parties moves toward the intimate end of 
the spectrum, criminal justice actors are more likely to regard the 
crime as technical rather than real, which produces a more lenient 
disposition.15 
Some commentators appear to endorse the treatment of stranger violence 
as more serious than non-stranger violence.16 
 
 
 13. See supra note 9. 
 14. See BLACK, supra note 9, at 40–46. 
 15. Levine, supra note 9, at 701; see also id. at 699–700 (recounting that “[w]hen New York City 
prosecutors used case facts and criminal background to distinguish between ‘real’ crimes (those that 
occur between strangers) and ‘technical’ crimes (those that occur between acquaintances or relatives) 
it was part of a larger effort to assess the overall seriousness of the crime and the actual harm suffered 
by the victim”). 
 16. After conducting a lengthy study of the criminal courts in New York City, authors for the 
Vera Institute of Justice remarked: 
At the root of much of the crime brought to court is anger—simple or complicated anger 
between two or more people who know each other. Expression of anger results in the 
commission of technical felonies, yet defense attorneys, judges and prosecutors recognize that 
in many cases conviction and prison sentences are inappropriate responses. . . . The 
congestion and drain on resources caused by an excessive number of such cases in the courts 
weakens the ability of the criminal justice system to deal quickly and decisively with the 
“real” felons, who may be getting lost in the shuffle. The risk that they will be returned to the 
street increases, as does the danger to law abiding citizens on whom they prey. 
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at xv. For other commentary apparently endorsing the treatment 
of stranger crime as more serious, see, e.g., RIEDEL, supra note 5, at 2 (“While stranger violence 
represents a smaller proportion of criminal violence than that between persons known to each other, its 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Social scientists have long considered the victim-offender relationship 
an important facet of violent crime.17 And when studying the effects of 
other variables (such as race, gender, and social class) on criminal justice 
decision making, many social science studies include a relationship 
between the offender and his victim as a control variable.18  
Although the available evidence does not conclusively establish, as an 
empirical matter, that cases involving violence by non-strangers are in fact 
treated more leniently than stranger violence, some studies have found 
that, where a prior relationship exists between the victim and the offender, 
a violent act tends to be treated more as a personal dispute than as a crime. 
While there is a range of quality and strength of findings, several studies 
indicate that violent crimes by strangers are treated as more serious than 
comparable crimes by non-strangers at arrest, prosecution, and sentencing. 
Indeed, one study reported statements indicating that some court officials 
do not believe non-stranger violence cases belong in the criminal courts.19 
One study recorded prosecutors making “disparaging remarks about non-
stranger violence cases,”20 and another described a judge’s reaction to a 
 
 
effects are disproportionately greater. Stranger murders and violence represent one of the more 
frightening forms of criminal victimization.”); Ron Langevin & Lorraine Handy, Stranger Homicide in 
Canada: A National Sample and a Psychiatric Sample, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 398, 398 
(1987) (“Homicide is understandable in cases where intense relationships such as romantic 
involvements or rivalries exist; it is, however, difficult to comprehend when total strangers have been 
killed.”). 
 17. “The issue of victim/offender relationships in homicide has been treated as an important 
concept for a long time.” Marc Riedel & Roger K. Przybylski, Stranger Murders and Assault: A Study 
of a Neglected Form of Stranger Violence, in HOMICIDE: THE VICTIM/OFFENDER CONNECTION 359, 
362 (Anna Victoria Wilson ed., 1993); see also Scott H. Decker, Exploring Victim Offender 
Relationships in Homicide: The Role of Individual and Even Characteristics, 10 JUST. Q. 585, 585 
(1993) (“An important dimension of homicides is the relationship between victim and offenders.”); 
Colin Loftin et al., An Attribute Approach to Relationships Between Offenders and Victims in 
Homicide, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 259, 259 (1987) (“The relationship between the victim and 
the offender is an important variable in studies of personal violence because it places the event within 
the context of social structures.”). 
 18. See Myrna Dawson, Rethinking the Boundaries of Intimacy at the End of the Century: The 
Role of Victim-Defendant Relationship in Criminal Justice Decisionmaking Over Time, 38 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 105, 107 (2004); see also Riedel & Przybylski, supra note 17, at 362 (“The 
victim/offender relationship is a variable that has consistently been used by many studies of 
homicide.”). 
 19. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NON-STRANGER VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL 
COURT’S RESPONSE 2 (1983) (“Court officials are cited as believing that [non-stranger violence] cases 
do not appropriately belong in the criminal courts.”). 
 20. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 4 (“[I]n the studies 
conducted by the research staff of the Victim/Witness Assistance Project in Brooklyn Criminal Court, 
it was not uncommon to hear prosecutors make disparaging remarks about non-stranger violence 
cases.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
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fourteen-year-old girl’s claim that her mother’s boyfriend had raped her: 
“This was really a Family Court squabble.”21  
Several studies conclude that, all else being equal, a victim is less 
likely to report an assailant with whom she has a preexisting 
relationship,22 and thus the assailant is less likely to be arrested than if he 
had been a stranger.23 Various explanations for the discrepancy between 
reporting for stranger and non-stranger victims have been given. The 
victim may fear retaliation,24 she may be pressured or persuaded by others 
who also know the offender,25 or she may reconcile with the offender and 
 
 
 21. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 48. For more recent examples of judges and juries 
treating domestic violence cases with relative leniency, see CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. 
MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AND A MEASURE OF MAN 180–83 
(2000). 
 22. This Article uses the masculine pronoun when referring to violent offenders and the feminine 
pronoun when referring to victims of violent crime. This distinction has been made both to provide 
clarity as well as to reflect that the overwhelming majority of violent offenders are male and that, to 
the extent women are involved in violent crime, they are more likely to be victims of violence. See 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS: INCLUDING 
STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES, at 11, tbl.2.3 & 13, tbl.2.6 (2005) (reporting that 
men account for 80% of all violent offenders and that women account for 20% of violent offenders and 
45% of violence victims). 
 23. See RIEDEL, supra note 5, at 71–77 (collecting and discussing sources); see also NAT’L INST. 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 4; Richard R. Sparks, Surveys of Victimization—An Optimistic 
Assessment, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds., 1981) 
(noting that respondents are less likely to report a crime against them by a relative or acquaintance 
than by a stranger, other things being equal); Richard Block, Why Notify the Police: The Victim’s 
Decision to Notify the Police of an Assault, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 555, 560–61 (1974) (citing data from 
190 assaults which showed that 66% of stranger assaults were reported to the police; 51% of assaults 
involving a non-stranger non-relative were reported; and 44% of relative assaults were reported). 
 Because most violent crimes occur outside the view of law enforcement, an arrest can be made 
only if a crime is reported to the police. See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & DON M. GOTTFREDSON, 
DECISION MAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 48 (2d 
ed. 1998) (“[I]t is the victim of the crime rather than the police officer who is the principal initiator of 
criminal law.”). Obviously, this is not necessarily the case for homicide. While victims of nonfatal 
violence can “choose to conceal the existence of the offense from the police unless it is observed by 
them or other witnesses, . . . the unexplained absence of another person”—or the discovery of a dead 
body—suggests “the possibility of homicide” and is thus likely to “stimulate[] inquiries by others.” 
RIEDEL, supra note 5, at 59–60. 
 24. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 69 (“[S]ometimes there’s intimidation, a bribe or a 
scare to put off the complaining witness. I just don’t have time to find out—the drive is just to clear the 
calendar.”) (quoting one New York City prosecutor speaking about non-stranger robbery cases); 
Sparks, supra note 23, at 463 (noting that “studies also confirm that victims who know the defendant 
are particularly likely to fear retaliation or to want to protect their relationship with the offender”). 
 25. 
[W]here the offender and victim are relatives, their interaction is very likely to continue 
beyond the time of the incident. Given this additional time period, it is likely that the event is 
discussed and reevaluated by the victim, his family and the offender. Other members of the 
family may encourage a non-criminal definition.  
RIEDEL, supra note 5, at 74; see also NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, 
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 94 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that in intra-family sex 
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decide that she does not wish to see him punished.26 The fact that a victim 
has a preexisting relationship with an offender may cause her to view the 
offender’s act of violence within the broader context of that relationship. 
In contrast, when a person is victimized by a stranger, her entire 
impression of the offender is defined by the violent crime, making it much 
easier for the victim to label her attacker a criminal.27 
In addition to the lower number of arrests for non-strangers, studies 
show that cases where the victim and offender are strangers are less likely 
to be dismissed by the prosecutor28 or to result in an acquittal by the jury29 
 
 
abuse cases, the non-offending parent “may protect the child, pressure the child not to talk about the 
abuse, or persuade the child to recant the disclosure so the perpetrator does not face the criminal 
justice system”). 
 26. Some non-stranger violence victims are hesitant to pursue traditional criminal prosecution 
because they wish to protect the offender or because they are economically dependent on the offender. 
See Sparks, supra note 23, at 463. 
 27. Professor Sam Pillsbury has alluded to this phenomenon: 
When called upon to judge a stranger who is to some extent responsible for a serious harm, 
the decision maker’s temptation is to ignore moral complexities and declare the person and 
his act entirely evil. The decision maker labels the offender a Criminal, remaining indifferent 
to the person—the being capable of both good and evil—behind that label. In this way the 
offender is designated as “other.” The more we can designate a person as different from 
ourselves, the fewer moral doubts we have about condemnation and punishment. We assign 
the offender the role of Monster, a move that justifies harsh treatment and insulates us from 
moral concerns about the suffering we inflict. 
 In our private lives, the fact that we otherwise value those we judge checks the 
temptation to exaggerate their wrongdoing. The people who hurt us are often friends, 
relatives, and colleagues—individuals whose good points we acknowledge and value. Our 
judgment takes place within a context of caring, limiting the tendency to exaggerate evil. 
SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 69 (1998); see 
also RIEDEL, supra note 5, at 74 (“Where the offender is a stranger, the definition of the [violent] act at 
the time of the event is not subject to restructuring because the victim and offender are not likely to 
have any further interaction. . . . On the other hand, where the offender and victim are relatives, their 
interaction is very likely to continue beyond the time of the incident. Given this additional time period, 
it is likely that the event is discussed and reevaluated by the victim, his family and the offender. . . . 
[W]hen one has a close relationship with an individual one tends, over time, to put the assault into the 
context of one’s overall relationship with the person and as a consequence the incident tends to 
become normalized.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. For example, a study of assault cases in Los Angeles revealed that “non-stranger cases [were] 
dismissed three times as often as stranger-to-stranger cases.” NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, 
at 92. A 1970s study of felony arrests in New York City revealed that prior relationships between a 
victim and an offender “were often mentioned by prosecutors, in the deep sample interviews, as their 
reason for offering reduced charges and light sentences in return for a plea of guilty. Even more 
commonly, prior relationships led to dismissals.” VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 20. 
Similarly, a 1970s study of arrests in the District of Columbia found that prosecutors were more likely 
to dismiss cases in non-stranger robberies “due to some sort of witness problem,” such as “witness 
failed to appear, witness appeared but signed a statement indicating unwillingness to cooperate, 
witness gave garbled or inconsistent testimony, and witness indicated reluctance to testify.” BRIAN 
FORST ET AL., WHAT HAPPENS AFTER ARREST? A COURT PERSPECTIVE OF POLICE OPERATIONS IN 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 24 (1977); see id. at 28 (noting similar findings for violent offenses other 
than robbery); see also Delbert S. Elliott, Criminal Justice Procedures in Family Violence Crimes, in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
p 343 Hessick book pages.doc1/11/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] VIOLENCE BETWEEN LOVERS, STRANGERS, AND FRIENDS 353 
 
 
 
 
than cases involving non-strangers. The findings from these studies, 
viewed in conjunction with several recorded comments by prosecutors,30 
suggest that prosecutors view at least some episodes of non-stranger 
violence as private disputes between two individuals. Stranger violence, 
by contrast, is perceived to be a crime committed against the community at 
large.31 
The evidence with respect to sentencing is less conclusive. Several 
studies have documented that stranger violence is more likely to lead to 
the imposition of the death penalty.32 Other studies indicate that stranger 
rapists are more likely to receive longer sentences than non-stranger 
rapists.33 But with respect to other violent crimes (assault and robbery), the 
 
 
FAMILY VIOLENCE 427, 460 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989) (“[W]hatever the type of 
crime, the proportion of cases prosecuted is lower when the offender knows the victim.”); ELLEN 
GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 114 (1993) (study of child 
sex abuse found that when offender was not a member of victim’s family, charges were less likely to 
be dropped and offender less likely to be diverted to treatment). But see Rodney F. Kingsnorth et al., 
Sexual Assault: The Role of Prior Relationship and Victim Characteristics in Case Processing, 16 
JUST. Q. 275, 278 (1999) (“Studies limited to bivariate analysis are more likely to find effects than 
those employing more complex methods.”). 
 29. See GOTTFREDSON & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 23, at 61–62 (recounting a 1970s study’s 
finding that for both violent and non-violent offenses “convictions were more likely to result from 
offenses occurring between strangers than in similar offenses between strangers”); see also FORST ET 
AL., supra note 28, at 24 (finding that “convictions are more likely to occur in . . . robbery arrests when 
the victim did not know his or her assailant prior to the occurrence of the offense”); id. at 26–28 
(“[C]onviction rates in stranger-to-stranger violent offenses other than robbery are, on the whole, 
nearly twice as large as they are in intrafamily violent episodes, and they are significantly larger than 
for the aggregate of all nonstranger violent offenses other than robbery.”). But see Kingsnorth et al., 
supra note 28, at 291 (reporting similar conviction rates for stranger and non-stranger rapes). 
 30. See supra notes 19–21. 
 31. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 4. See generally Part II.D, infra. 
 32. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 58 (1984) 
(“Those who killed strangers were far more likely to be sentenced to death than those who killed 
family members, friends, or acquaintances: ten times as likely in Georgia, four times as likely in 
Florida, and over six times as likely in Illinois.”); see also Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns 
for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1340 (1985) (noting “an observed 
pattern under which, all other factors being equal, stranger-to-stranger killings are more ‘prone’ to 
death sentences than those in which the victim knew the defendant”); Raymond Paternoster, Race of 
Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 770 tbl.2 (1983) (noting that the probability of a prosecutor seeking a death 
penalty in a capital murder case was 0.429 in cases where the stranger was an offender and 0.248 
where the victim was a non-stranger). 
 33. See, e.g., Kingsnorth et al., supra note 28, at 295 (“Whether the perpetrator was a stranger or 
a nonstranger is important in determining sentence length. The existence of any kind of prior 
relationship appears to reduce sentence length by 35 months.”); Jennifer S. McCormick et al., 
Relationship to Victim Predicts Sentence Length in Sexual Assault Cases, 13 J. OF INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 413, 417 (1998) (study of sentence lengths of rapists incarcerated in Ontario). Offenders 
who sexually assaulted strangers received an average sentence of 66.1 months, while those offenders 
who assaulted acquaintances received an average sentence of 52.8 months. Offenders who raped 
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effect of an existing victim-offender relationship is less clear. Some 
studies have documented an effect34 while others have not,35 and several 
studies that documented an effect have been criticized for not controlling 
for other variables that may have affected the results.36  
 
 
intimate partners (including offenders who raped former partners) received the shortest average 
sentence, 49.3 months. Id. at 416 tbl.1. After performing a regression analysis to control for a variety 
of factors, including age, socioeconomic status, prior offenses, degree of force used, type of instrument 
of force used, and amount of physical injury, the study’s authors concluded that the victim-offender 
relationship was one of only two significant predictors of sentence length. The regression analysis 
explained only 16% of the variance in sentence length. “Surprisingly, criminal history was not 
predictive of sentence length. Moreover, instrumentality of force was the only significant predictor 
among the index offense characteristics (β = .28). Victim offender relationship was the only other 
significant predictor of sentence length (β = -.22).” Id. at 417; see also Simon, Sex Offender 
Legislation, supra note 6, at 511 n.157 (collecting studies that found “subjects in experiments 
recommend a less severe sentence for a convicted rapist if there had been a prior dating relationship 
between the parties”). 
 34. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 78 (noting that the study’s “few clear cases 
of predatory robbery against strangers were [in contrast to the non-stranger robberies] punished 
severely”); id. at 135–36 (“[Judges and prosecutors] were outspoken in their reluctance to prosecute as 
full-scale felonies some cases that erupted from quarrels between friends or lovers. . . . Thus, where 
prior relationship cases survived dismissal, they generally received lighter dispositions than stranger 
cases.”); NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 4 (noting that data from one study “suggest that the 
court is likely to give defendants in relationship cases lighter sentences than defendants in stranger-to-
stranger cases, for similar offenses”); see also Simon, Sex Offender Legislation, supra note 6, at 493 
n.28 (recounting the findings of a 1998 nationwide study of child molestation prosecutions that 
“[s]tranger molesters were substantially more likely to be incarcerated than nonstranger molesters” 
(citing AMERICAN BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, AND COMMISSION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, 
LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 25–27 
(1998))). 
 Not all studies found significant differences. For example, a recent study of incarcerated offenders 
who were serving sentences for homicide, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and assault in Arizona found 
offenders who victimized strangers received only moderately longer sentences than offenders who 
victimized non-strangers. Leonore M.J. Simon, Legal Treatment of the Victim-Offender Relationship 
in Crimes of Violence, 11 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 94, 102 (1996). The difference in sentence 
length was small—less than two months. But Simon controlled for many important variables, 
including seriousness of conviction, prior record, plea bargaining, and whether the victim was injured, 
and the largest difference in sentence length she discerned in the entire study, which occurred when the 
offender entered a plea, resulted in only a four-month difference. See id. at 103 tbl.6. 
 35. See, e.g., Martha A. Myers, Offended Parties and Official Reactions: Victims and the 
Sentencing of Criminal Defendants, 20 SOC. Q. 529, 537 (1979) (studying defendants convicted at trial 
in Indianapolis and concluding that a previous relationship between victim and offender did not affect 
judges’ decisions to sentence the offender to prison or to impose a less serious sanction (e.g., 
probation)). 
 36. See Myrna Dawson, Rethinking the Boundaries of Intimacy at the End of the Century: The 
Role of Victim-Defendant Relationship in Criminal Justice Decisionmaking Over Time, 38 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 105, 107–08 (2004) (noting that “studies using bivariate analyses have consistently found 
that violence between intimates is treated more leniently by criminal justice officials than violence that 
occurs between strangers”; however, “the effect of victim-defendant relationship on court outcomes is 
less clear in more rigorous multivariate analyses that enable researchers to control for the effects of 
other legal (e.g., prior criminal record, offense seriousness) and extralegal (e.g., race, age) factors”); 
see also Kingsnorth et al., supra note 28, at 281. 
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The authors of these studies and other commentaries on arrests, 
prosecutions, and sentencing practices suggest that the effect of a 
preexisting relationship between victim and offender appears strongest in 
situations where officials have broad discretion.37 For example, police and 
prosecutors generally perceive themselves as having more discretion in 
less serious cases, such as in cases of simple assault, and therefore are 
more likely not to proceed in a case involving non-strangers. On the other 
hand, criminal justice actors are less likely to exercise their sentencing 
discretion to minimize criminal punishment in cases where the victim 
suffered serious injury.38 (Two notable exceptions to this trend are rape 
and capital sentencing.)39 
However, the difference in treatment of stranger and non-stranger 
violence is not limited to discretionary actions. For at least some crimes, 
the different treatment is standardized, if not codified. Rape is one 
example. The differing treatment for stranger and non-stranger rapes is 
codified, and is not simply the result of individual decision makers. For 
example, several states have statutory provisions that “mandate lesser 
penalties for spousal rape than for other rapes regardless of the force 
used.”40 The Model Penal Code endorses this approach. It explicitly 
 
 
 37. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 28, at 459; NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 55 
(describing design of study and remarking that “cases which we believed had a large potential for 
discretionary decisions [were cases] which involved relatively minor incidents with few injuries and no 
independent witnesses”) (emphasis added). 
 38. See Gerald T. Hotaling et al., Intrafamily Violence, and Crime and Violence outside the 
Family, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 315, 319 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989) (“Violence in 
families that has a high probability of producing an injury is typically seen as comparable to criminal 
violence, but there is a lack of consensus as to whether ‘minor’ violence in families should be similarly 
conceptualized.”); VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that, with the exception of rape, 
“felonies of violence show conviction rates declining with the lessening seriousness of the crime, from 
72% for homicide arrests to 41% for assaults”); id. at 58 (noting that as one New York City prosecutor 
explained: “Family cases are always treated differently, . . . but the fact that a gun was used in this 
assault, and the severe injuries, means there was no question of dismissal even if the complainants 
wanted to withdraw”).  
 39. While rape and first degree murder are undoubtedly serious harms, there is evidence that 
non-stranger rapes and capital murders receive less serious treatment than comparable stranger crimes. 
See supra notes 32–33. 
 40. Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A 
New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1490 (2003) (identifying six states 
that have separate statutes and four states that mandate lesser penalties); see also Jill Elaine Hasday, 
Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1484–85 (2000) (noting 
that some states “provide for vastly reduced penalties if a rape occurs in marriage”). 
 Forell and Matthews describe a 1992 case from North Carolina—a state which recognizes marital 
rape as a crime—in which a jury chose to disregard apparently overwhelming evidence of a marital 
rape, including a videotape of the incident, and acquitted the defendant. FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra 
note 21, at 232. 
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exempts a man who victimizes his wife from its definition of the crime of 
rape.41 The explanatory notes explain this exemption as follows: 
With respect to the crime of rape itself, the Model Code seeks to 
introduce a rational grading scheme by dividing the offense into 
three felony levels, reserving the most serious category for those 
instances of aggression resulting in serious bodily injury or for 
certain cases of imposition where there is no voluntary social and 
sexual relationship between the parties.42 
Some jurisdictions impose additional elements for marital rape, such as 
a requirement that the rape be reported within a specified period of time, 
that the offender and victim be separated or divorced at the time of the 
assault, or that the offender use force or violence beyond mere coercion 
(which is sufficient in the case of stranger rapes).43 And some states have 
retained marital immunity for other sexual offenses short of forcible 
rape.44 
It is tempting to attribute this different treatment of stranger and non-
stranger rape to concerns about consent. Because consent is a complete 
defense to rape,45 and because consent is more likely in situations where 
the victim and offender know one another, one might say the different 
treatment of non-stranger rape may be attributable to lingering doubts 
about liability.46 
But rape is not the only violent crime for which the law explicitly treats 
stranger crime as more serious than non-stranger crime. In cases of child 
 
 
 41. “A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape . . . .” MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (2001). 
 42. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 explanatory note (2001) (emphasis added). 
 43. Anderson, supra note 40 at 1491–96; see also Hasday, supra note 40, at 1484–85 (“A 
majority of states still retain some form of the rule exempting a husband from prosecution for raping 
his wife. Some states require a couple to be separated at the time of the injury (and sometimes extend 
the exemption to cover unmarried cohabitants). Some only recognize marital rape if it involves 
physical force and/or serious physical harm. Some provide for vastly reduced penalties if a rape occurs 
in marriage, or create special procedural requirements for marital rape prosecutions.”). 
 44. See Anderson, supra note 40, at 1470, 1489. 
 45. Consent poses a unique problem in cases of rape that it does not pose in other violent crimes. 
See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and 
the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1806 (1992) (“[C]onsent to violence is somewhat 
exotic, and therefore far less credibly alleged [than consent to sexual contact alone].”). For a 
fascinating account of the origins of this issue, see Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1 
(1998). 
 46. See, e.g., Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and 
Sexual Assault Trials, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437, 461 (2006) (noting that cases of stranger rape 
“entail a higher burden in proving the alleged rape event was consensual, because there is a less 
developed rape myth structure about an accuser’s willingness to have sex with a stranger” as compared 
to cases of acquaintance rape). 
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molestation—where offenses by strangers account for only 7% of all 
cases47 and where consent clearly does not pose the same problem that it 
does in rape—assaults by strangers are treated as more serious. The 
criminal codes of some states include not only the offense of child rape, 
but also a lesser offense of incest.48 While such a statutory scheme 
presumably allows for prosecution of an intra-family offender for the 
greater offense of child rape,49 the availability of the lesser offense of 
incest suggests that at least some intra-family offenders will be prosecuted 
for the lesser offense, for which stranger offenders are not eligible.50 
In addition, several states exclude offenders from sex offender 
registries51—which are touted as necessary for crime prevention52—if the 
offender had an existing relationship with his victim. For example, in 
California, offenders may apply for exclusion from the sex offender 
registry published on the internet if, inter alia, the victim “was a child, 
stepchild, grandchild, or sibling of the offender.”53 The state of New York 
considers an offender’s “relationship to the victim” when determining “the 
 
 
 47. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG 
CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT AND OFFENDER 
CHARACTERISTICS, at 10 (2000). Approximately 34% of child molestation offenders were family 
members and 59% were acquaintances. Id. Cf. GRAY, supra note 28, at 84–85 (strangers accounted for 
13.7% of child sex abuse cases in study of eight jurisdictions in 1987–88). 
 48. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.64.020 (Supp. 1998) (designating incest as a Class B 
felony) and TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02 (Vernon 2005) (designating sexual intercourse with, inter 
alia a descendant or stepchild as a felony in the third degree), with WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.073 
(Supp. 1998) (designating the rape of a child as a class A felony), and TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 22.011 (Vernon 2005) (designating sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 14 as a felony in 
the first degree). 
 49. See Nelson v. State, 612 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (rejecting argument of 
defendant, who was convicted of raping his daughter, that he should have been prosecuted for the 
offense of incest, rather than the offense of raping a child). 
 50. See Simon, Sex Offender Legislation, supra note 6, at 494 (noting that an “explicit 
discrimination against the stranger offender occurs by inclusion of a less serious category for incest 
offenders under family offenses than the child rape offenses included under sex offenses”). 
 51. While courts have held that sex offender registries generally are not punitive in nature, see 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), many commentators have noted that such registries cause serious 
hardships for the offenders included within them. See, e.g., Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal 
Justice: Federalism, Crime Control and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1854–
55 (2005); Note, Making Outcasts out of Outlaws: The Unconstitutionality of Sex Offender 
Registration and Criminal Alien Detention, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2731 (2004). 
 52. See, e.g., State of California, Office of the Attorney General, Megan’s Law Information on 
Registered Sex Offenders, http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/homepage.aspx?lang=ENGLISH; 
Pennsylvania State Police, Megan’s Law Website, http://www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us/. 
 53. “Registrants whose only registrable sex offenses are for the following offenses may apply for 
exclusion: . . . any offense which did not involve penetration or oral copulation, the victim of which 
was a child, stepchild, grandchild, or sibling of the offender, and for which the offender successfully 
completed or is successfully completing probation.” State of California, Office of the Attorney 
General, Megan’s Law, Sex Offenders Tracking, http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/sexreg.aspx. 
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level of community notification and duration of registration” for sex 
offenders.54 The State of New Jersey similarly considers the offender-
victim relationship when determining the extent of notification for sex 
offenders. Specifically, the state manual that sets forth the relevant criteria 
for notification denotes the offender’s “victim selection” as one of the 
criteria used to determine an offender’s “risk level.”55 The manual 
explains that “[v]ictim selection is related to likelihood of reoffense (with 
intrafamilial offenders having the lowest base rate of reoffense) as well as 
risk to the community at large.”56 Notably, the New Jersey assessment 
scheme does not limit itself to a dangerousness assessment based only on 
familial relationships; it specifically classifies family member assaults as 
“low risk,” stranger assaults as “high risk,” and assaults by acquaintances 
and within other social and business relationships as “moderate risk.”57 
II. EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TREATING 
STRANGER CRIME MORE SERIOUSLY THAN NON-STRANGER CRIME 
Race, gender, and class differences between the offenders and victims 
of stranger and non-stranger violence may go a long way to explaining the 
more serious treatment of stranger crime. Because individuals tend to 
associate mostly with other individuals of the same social class and race, 
non-stranger violence is most likely to be intra-racial and intra-class.58 
Stranger crime, by contrast, is more likely to cross racial and class lines.59  
 
 
 54. New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Sex Offender Risk Level 
Determination, http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/nsor/risk_levels.htm; see also N.Y. CORRECT. LAW 
§ 168-l(5)(b)(i) (McKinney 2003) (establishing Board of Examiners for sex offenders, directing the 
Board to “develop guidelines and procedures to assess the risk of a repeat offense by such sex offender 
and the threat posed to the public safety,” and specifying that “guidelines shall be based upon, but not 
limited to, the following: . . . the relationship between such sex offender and the victim”). 
 55.  N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUBLIC SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY 
NOTIFICATION LAWS, EXHIBIT E: REGISTRANT RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE MANUAL 5 (2005), available 
at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/megan/meganguidelines1-05.pdf. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See infra note 113. 
 58.  
[O]pportunity for crimes against the person in the United States is socially structured. Most 
intimate social interaction in this country takes place among people of the same race. Thus it 
makes sense that crimes of violence that arise from personal disagreements and 
confrontations will involve members of the same race. 
JOHN E. CONKLIN, CRIMINOLOGY 302 (1981).  
For crimes of violence the opportunity to commit a crime is largely a function of social 
relationships between people and the likelihood that interaction will become violent. Murder 
and aggravated assault generally occur between people of similar social backgrounds, because 
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Women and children are far more likely than adult men to be the 
victims of violence at the hands of a relative or an intimate partner, rather 
than at the hands of a stranger.60 And stranger violence is more likely than 
non-stranger violence to involve a white male victim.61 A 1967 
Presidential Commission Report indicates that law enforcement 
historically overlooked violence in these lower socioeconomic groups: 
Not long ago there was a tendency to dismiss reports of all but the 
most serious offenses in slum areas and segregated minority group 
districts. The poor and the segregated minority groups were left to 
take care of their own problems. . . . One of the main causes for an 
increase in the recording of violent crime appears to be a decrease 
in the toleration of aggressive and violent behaviour, even in those 
slum and poor tenement areas where violence has always been 
regarded as a normal and accepted way of settling quarrels, 
jealousies or even quite trivial arguments.62 
 
 
[they] interact with each other more often than they do with they do with people of different 
backgrounds. . . .  
 . . . Robbery occurs between people of the same social background less often than other 
crimes that involve violence. . . . Although data are lacking, a typical robbery probably 
involves an offender of a lower social class than his victim. 
Id. at 306; see also Dean C. Rojek & James L. Wilson, Interracial vs. Intraracial Offenses in Term of 
the Victim/Offender Relationship, in HOMICIDE: THE VICTIM/OFFENDER CONNECTION 249, 264 (Anna 
Victoria Wilson ed., 1993) (“Because of the intensely segregated nature of American communities, 
homicide is an intraracial phenomenon: blacks kill blacks, and whites kill whites. Further, most 
homicides are acts of passion that take place between family members or acquaintances, and only 
rarely are strangers involved.”). 
 59. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 34, tbl.5.5 (noting that 54.4% of 
stranger violence offenders are white and 44.5% are black), with id. at 32, tbl.5.3 (noting that 70.1% of 
stranger violence victims are white and 23.9% are black). 
 60. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 11, tbl.2.3; see also CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION 1995, supra note 2, at 34 (“Males were more likely than females to be victimized by 
strangers.”); CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1993, supra note 2, at 30 (“Males were more likely than 
females to be victimized by strangers. . . . Males, however, were significantly more likely than females 
to be victimized by a casual acquaintance.”). 
 61. See, e.g., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1995, supra note 2, at 34 (“Whites were more likely than 
blacks to be victimized by strangers.”); see also CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 6, at 40 (“Robbery, 
the only crime of violence in which whites were victimized more often than Negroes, is also the only 
one that is predominantly interracial.”); supra note 60. 
 62. CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 6, at 25 (emphasis added) (quoting, in part, a 1963 study 
from the University of Cambridge’s Institute of Criminology); see also SHERMAN, supra note 11, at 
28–29 (“An American Bar Foundation study found in the 1950s that what might have been called an 
aggravated assault in a white middle-class neighborhood was often written off as a ‘family 
disturbance’ in a black neighborhood.”); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion not to Invoke the 
Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 574–75 
(1960) (noting police attitudes that assaults are common, resources are scarce, and that some 
policemen feel “that assault is an acceptable means of settling disputes among Negroes, and that when 
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This report is remarkable not only because it notes the past trend of 
ignoring crime in poor minority communities, but also because it identifies 
the then-prevailing view that non-stranger violence is a well-settled and 
accepted way of life in those communities. This evidence of past views 
towards non-stranger crime in poor minority communities makes it 
difficult to dismiss the racial implications of the prioritization of stranger 
crime. 
But while gender, race, and class may provide valuable information for 
explaining the origins63 and enduring viability of a criminal justice system 
that prioritizes stranger violence,64 none of these factors can provide a 
 
 
both assailant and victim are Negro, there is no immediate discernable harm to the public which 
justifies a decision to invoke the criminal process”); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in 
the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 913–14 (1962) (recounting “a calculated 
nonenforcement of certain laws [including felonious assault] against the Negro population, justified on 
the ground that a lesser standard of morality prevails”). Riva Siegel’s work on the history of domestic 
violence includes several historic sources identifying a “doctrinally explicit assumption that violence 
was a common part of life among the married poor.” Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife 
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2134 (1996) (citing Bailey v. Bailey, 97 
Mass. 373, 379 (1867)). 
 63. For example, Forell and Matthews have contended that “[d]omestic violence came to public 
attention in the mid-1970s. Before then it was largely invisible, considered a purely private matter, 
ignored by the police.” FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 21, at 158. Riva Seigel tells a more 
complicated story of domestic violence, noting that it captured public attention at several times in early 
America, and that criminal laws forbidding husbands from beating their wives were used to punish and 
otherwise subjugate men from poor, immigrant, or African American backgrounds during 
Reconstruction. Siegel, supra note 62, at 2121–41; see also SHERMAN, supra note 11, at 45–48. 
 64. For examples of how gender may explain the different treatment of stranger crime, see 
SHERMAN, supra note 11, at 41 (“[T]here is greater cultural distance between male police officers and 
female citizens than between police and male citizens. This in turn may shape moral evaluations of the 
seriousness of the circumstances of each case.”) (describing Donald Black’s hypothesis); G. Kristian 
Miccio, Exiled From the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Conceptions of State 
Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 129–30 (2005) (discussing the “gendered nature” of states’ 
failure to arrest in domestic violence cases); see also DAVID PETERSON DEL MAR, WHAT TROUBLE I 
HAVE SEEN: A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES 7 (1996) (“The social, economic, and physical 
advantages that society has disproportionately awarded to men has made husband abuse rare and wife 
abuse commonplace.”); FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 21, at 163 (“For men, the law generally 
treats violence against an intimate as more permissible than violence against an acquaintance or a 
stranger.”). 
 For examples of how race and class may explain the different treatment of stranger crime, see 
JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 113 
(1997) (“Research has shown that stereotypes about criminals clearly have a racial element. A 1993 
Gallup poll in the United States found that 37 percent of both whites and blacks see blacks as ‘more 
likely’ than other groups to commit crimes. . . . [This survey] did not specify the nature of the crimes, 
but in all probability, the association between race and crime in the public mind focuses on crimes of 
violence, street crimes and drug offenses.”); Kurt Weis & Sandra Weis, Victimology and the 
Justification of Rape, in 5 VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW FOCUS 3, 6 (I. Drapkin & E. Viano eds., 1975) 
(postulating that individuals of “inferior social status,” namely “lower class individuals, racial 
minorities, and females” are seen as having little or no reason to complain about their victimization 
because they belong to an inferior social class). 
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justification for such a system. A feminist critique of criminal law65 
provides insight into how the different treatment of stranger and non-
stranger crimes may have originally developed and may help to explain 
why it has endured. But it does not provide a defense of the modern 
treatment of stranger crime—quite the contrary, it suggests that the system 
of treating stranger violence more seriously than violence in personal 
relationships may be a product of some particularly undesirable norms.66 
Because it is the goal of this Article to determine whether more serious 
treatment of stranger violence can be justified, it does not revisit the 
powerful feminist critique of criminal law doctrines, such as the 
provocation defense, surrounding non-stranger violence.67 
This Part examines five potential justifications for treating stranger 
violence more seriously: (a) stranger offenders are more culpable than 
non-stranger offenders; (b) stranger offenders are more dangerous than 
non-stranger offenders; (c) non-stranger victims are at least partially at 
fault for the offenders’ actions; (d) non-stranger violence is best resolved 
as a private or a non-criminal matter; and (e) stranger violence engenders 
greater fear and general public concern. These potential justifications have 
been included because each seems, at first glance, to be a legitimate reason 
for treating stranger violence more seriously than non-stranger violence. 
But testing each potential justification either against existing empirical 
data or through a series of hypothetical situations68 reveals that none is as 
persuasive as it first seems. 
 
 
 65. The feminist critique is “concerned with uncovering the ways that the criminal law 
contributes to women’s deprivation by continuing to reflect and protect patriarchal interests.” Dorothy 
E. Roberts, Foreword: The Meaning of Gender Equality in Criminal Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1994). For example, the feminist critique posits that although particular criminal 
law doctrines, such as the provocation defense and the consent defense to rape, are written as gender-
neutral rules, in practice they operate to the disadvantage of women. See generally CYNTHIA LEE, 
MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003). 
Provocation and consent are more plausibly raised as defenses in cases involving non-strangers than 
strangers. 
 66. See, e.g., Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against 
Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1317 
(1991) (“Crimes against women, especially rape and domestic violence, are decriminalized through the 
evil logic of a trilogy of suppositions: she must have asked for it; she must have enjoyed it; she must 
have deserved it. These decriminalizing efforts are rooted in beliefs and attitudes about women that 
sanction, or at least facilitate, violence against them.”). 
 67. For just a few examples of the feminist critique, see FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 21; 
JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY (1992); LEE, supra note 65; Susan Estrich, 
Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who 
Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71 (1992). 
 68. This Article uses empirical desert—that is, a punishment theory “that assigns punishment in 
ways that closely reflects the community’s intuitions about appropriate condemnation and 
punishment”—to challenge a phenomenon that seems be enjoy public support. Paul H. Robinson & 
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Before discussing the potential justifications, I want to note that 
information about a preexisting personal relationship may elicit certain 
assumptions about the offender, the victim, and the crime.69 Stranger 
offenders are perceived to act calculatingly, motivated by personal profit, 
and they are assumed to have randomly chosen an innocent victim.70 
Robbery is the classic example of stranger violence.71 In contrast, non-
stranger offenders are perceived to have acted spontaneously out of anger, 
and the non-stranger victim is thought to have played some role in the 
events leading up to the violent incident.72 
Because potential justifications may rely on these stereotypes, the 
stereotypes themselves are relevant in assessing the legitimacy of the 
justifications. Of course, that is not to say that all non-stranger violence is 
impulsive and motivated by anger, nor that all stranger violence is 
calculated and motivated by profit;73 rather, these stereotypes are useful 
 
 
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 456 (1997); see also Paul H. Robinson, 
Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical 8–9, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924917. This inductive model of testing the desirability of a rule or principle 
is commonly employed in criminal law analysis. See, e.g., Leo Katz, The Morality of Criminal Law: 
Why the Successful Assassin is More Wicked Than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CAL. L. REV. 791, 795–
96 (2000); Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 679, 684–85 (1994); see also John Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure to Ethics, 
60 PHIL. REV. 177 (1951). 
 69. “[K]knowledge of a prior relationship between the victim and the offender is a cue which 
elicits various stereotypical images about what occurred during the alleged incident and how the case 
will be handled at later stages of criminal processing.” Terance D. Miethe, Stereotypical Conceptions 
and Criminal Processing: The Case of the Victim Offender Relationship, 4 JUST. Q. 571, 572 (1987). 
 70. See infra note 72. 
 71. “For most citizens, ‘robbery’ conjures up a frightening set of images: street muggings, retail 
stick-ups and other incidents in which a threatening stranger confronts and demands money from a 
terrified victim. It is a crime of violence—stealing by force or threat of injury—and because the robber 
is thought to be a predatory rather than a spontaneous criminal, he may be the archetypal ‘real’ violent 
felon in the public imagination. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 63. 
 72. Albert Alschuler noted these presumptions, stating: 
We may sense, for example, that stranger and non-stranger crimes should ordinarily be 
treated differently. Violence directed against a stranger typically grows out of predatory, 
instrumental, professional crime or else is the product of sadism. Its terror proceeds partly 
from its suddenness and from the victim’s inability to know where it will stop. Violence 
directed against a non-stranger typically reflects anger (sometimes sustained, sometimes 
momentary), provocation (sometimes real, sometimes imagined), and complex, difficult-to-
untangle emotions that have developed over the course of an intimate, social, or working 
relationship. The victim often understands the genesis of this violence and, in most cases, 
senses that it is likely to stop short of homicide. 
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 901, 914 (1991). 
 73. The relationship between an offender and his victim is a separate variable in violent crime 
from the circumstances that precipitated the violence. “To use them as if they were interchangeable—
to assume, for example, that all homicides between acquaintances are impulsive and all homicides 
between strangers are instrumental—would be to misrepresent the truth. Of the two aspects, we have 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
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starting points. This Article concludes, however, that prioritizing stranger 
violence is unjustified even assuming the stereotypes are true. 
A. Offender Culpability 
The culpability argument―that is, the argument that stranger offenders 
are more culpable than non-stranger offenders―is based on the general 
notion that the relationship between offender and victim provides context 
for the violence,74 and that this context somehow excuses or mitigates the 
behavior.75 While the archetypal stranger offender has had no previous 
interactions with his victim, and thus his decision to commit a violent 
crime against the victim is calculated and predatory, the archetypal non-
stranger offender commits his offense against the backdrop of a larger 
relationship and usually in a situation where his decision to act violently 
was spontaneous and motivated by anger.76 This presumption 
encompasses two independent arguments about how a non-stranger 
offender is less culpable than a stranger offender: (1) the non-stranger 
offender is less culpable because his ability to control his violent actions is 
 
 
found circumstance to be, by far, the more fundamental—a basic variable to which everything else, 
including relationship is secondary.” C.R. BLOCK, HOMICIDE IN CHICAGO: AGGREGATE AND TIME 
SERIES PERSPECTIVES ON VICTIM, OFFENDER, AND CIRCUMSTANCES (1965–1981) 35 (1987), quoted 
in RIEDEL, supra note 5, at 11. 
 74. See Decker, supra note 17, at 592 (“[T]he greater frequency of interaction and attachment to 
others with whom one is intimately involved creates situations that are likely to lead to disputes, and 
potentially to fatal violence. The intensity of the stake in another’s well-being can be turned ‘upside-
down’ and can facilitate rather than insulate nonstrangers from violence.”); Levine, supra note 9, at 
701–02 (“Conventional wisdom suggests that crimes between strangers occur for mercenary or 
nonpersonal motives and often involve high levels of violence or damage. . . . In contrast, crimes 
between family members, friends, or acquaintances—otherwise known as intimates—are typically 
understood as driven by strong emotions and as embedded in preexisting complex relationships among 
the parties involved.”). Cf. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that in a “typical” 
assault involving non-strangers “the passion of the relationship led to infliction of injuries in the 
attack”). 
 75. Even if the context does not excuse or mitigate the offender’s violence, it allows the general 
public a way to contextualize the violence so that it does not seem completely random. This context 
may be relevant not only in intuitive assessments of culpability, but also intuitive judgments about an 
offender’s dangerousness because “the randomly targeted victim is quite apt to invoke . . . a strong 
sense of identification with the victim and a sense of ‘there, but for the grace of God, go I.’” Scott E. 
Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 343, 359 (2003).  
 76. For one example of a commentator espousing these archetypes, see Rojek & Wilson, supra 
note 58, at 264 (“[There are] distinctively different forms of homicide based on the varying degrees of 
relationship between the victim and the offender. . . . Homicides that occur between family and 
acquaintances are by far the highest in number and generally the least deterrable. Most of these 
homicides are caused by sudden and violent arguments over what appear to be insignificant matters or 
romantic entanglements. Homicide between strangers tends to be more property-oriented and more 
rational.”). See also Hotaling et al., supra note 38, at 324–25. 
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impaired by anger, and (2) even if the angered offender could easily 
control himself, violence motivated by anger is less blameworthy than 
violence motivated by profit.77 
1. Non-stranger Offender Less Able to Control His Violent Behavior 
It is a basic tenet of criminal law that, if an individual is completely 
incapable of controlling his actions, that individual should not be subject 
to criminal punishment.78 If an individual decides to violate the law after 
calm deliberation, most everyone would agree that he should be 
punished.79 But in situations where self-control is difficult, but still 
possible,80 punishment decisions become more complicated. 
The argument that an individual who is less capable of controlling 
himself should be punished less harshly is essentially as follows: because 
his anger made it more difficult for the offender to control himself, his 
subsequent loss of control is not as blameworthy as the completely calm 
individual who rationally chose to act violently.81 This argument has its 
roots in the provocation defense. That defense reduces the charge for an 
intentional homicide, which would otherwise qualify as murder, to 
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed upon adequate provocation 
in the heat of passion.82 
Under the common law provocation defense, the list of events 
constituting “adequate provocation” was quite limited—it included 
adultery, mutual combat, false arrest, and violent assault by the victim.83 
 
 
 77. These two arguments may overlap. For example, stranger violence may be viewed as more 
capable of control because it is motivated by financial profit. 
 78. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 160 (1982) (“[I]f punishment is 
to be justified at all, the criminal’s act must be that of a responsible agent: that is, it must be the act of 
one who could have kept the law which he has broken.”). 
 79. There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule, such as the line of defenses known as 
justifications. To be eligible for a justification defense, an individual’s otherwise illegal act must have 
been a necessary and proportional response to a threatened harm. See 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL 
LAW DEFENSES § 24(b) (1984). The necessary and proportionality requirements seem to almost invite 
deliberation by the offending individual. 
 80. See infra note 89. 
 81. “It is sometimes said that a person who commits a crime under the influence of emotion is 
less culpable than a person who acts calmly and deliberately.” Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 
89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1992 (2001). As Joshua Dressler explains the difficulty-of-control argument: 
“[T]he [provocation] defense is based on our common experience that when we become exceptionally 
angry . . . our ability to conform our conduct to the dictates of the law is seriously undermined, hence 
making law-abiding behavior far more difficult than in nonprovocative circumstances.” Joshua 
Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 959, 974 (2002). 
 82. See generally 1 ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 102. 
 83. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
p 343 Hessick book pages.doc1/11/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] VIOLENCE BETWEEN LOVERS, STRANGERS, AND FRIENDS 365 
 
 
 
 
While the requirements for a provocation defense have been relaxed in 
modern times,84 some qualitative requirement for the provoking event has 
been retained. Even the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional 
disturbance defense,85 which is substantially broader than the common law 
provocation defense and places a great deal of emphasis on the mental and 
emotional state of the offender, does not permit an offender free rein in 
arguing that any circumstance provoked his behavior. The extreme 
emotional disturbance defense is available only to the offender whose 
emotional disturbance “is one for which there is some reasonable 
explanation or excuse.”86 
The provocation doctrine’s requirement of legally adequate 
provocation may reflect the substantial consequences of the defense: a 
defendant who successfully raises a provocation defense will have a 
murder charge reduced to manslaughter. The less serious treatment of non-
stranger violence may sometimes have similarly, if not more, dramatic 
results, such as when a prosecutor decides to dismiss a case altogether. But 
the treatment of non-stranger violence as less culpable may also occur at 
times when finer distinctions of offender blameworthiness are made. 
Sentencing is a good example.87 Sentences are often reduced when a 
 
 
YALE L.J. 1331, 1341 (1997) (identifying these categories of adequate provocation as the “nineteenth 
century four”). 
 84. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 309 (1996) (“[M]odern authorities have tended to abandon categorical 
definitions of adequate provocation.”). 
 85. Under the Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (2006), an offender may receive a reduced charge 
of manslaughter when  
a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The 
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a 
person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be. 
 86. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 102(c)(2).  
The most important compromise which legal systems make over the subjective element [in 
responsibility] consists in its adoption of what has been unhappily termed the ‘objective 
standard.’ This may lead to an individual being treated for the purposes of conviction and 
punishment as if he possessed capacities for the control of his conduct which he did not 
possess, but which an ordinary or reasonable man possesses and would have exercised.  
HART, supra note 78, at 153. 
 87.  
[T]he sentencing process allows for finer distinctions of culpability than determinations of 
liability. Criminal liability is essentially binary: A defendant is either guilty or not guilty of an 
offense. By contrast, because criminal sentences are measured chronologically, a court can 
adjust a defendant’s sentence by a percentage of the overall sentence or by different set 
amounts of time. This flexibility is especially useful in making fine distinctions between the 
relative blameworthiness of various offenders. 
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 132 (2006). 
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defendant presents an imperfect defense.88 Thus, simply noting that the 
culpability argument fails to meet all of the requirements for a provocation 
defense does not settle the question whether the culpability argument 
justifies the prioritization of stranger violence in sentencing decisions.  
Determining whether a non-stranger offender’s difficulty controlling 
himself reduces his blameworthiness requires an examination of the theory 
underlying the culpability argument. The culpability argument does not 
rest on the assumption that the angry offender cannot control himself; 
while anger may make it more difficult for non-stranger offenders to 
control their behavior, non-stranger offenders still are capable of 
controlling their violent outbursts.89 The question, therefore, is not 
whether non-stranger offenders can control their violent urges, but rather 
whether the relative difficulty of control should affect punishment 
severity. In other words, as the desire to commit a crime increases, should 
the increasingly difficult struggle to resist that desire reduce an offender’s 
punishment? 
When the culpability argument is phrased in these most general terms, 
a problem with the argument begins to come into focus. The problem is 
that we routinely increase punishment to account for increased incentives 
to commit a crime in order to achieve optimal deterrence. As Professor 
Steven Shavell succinctly puts it: “The higher the benefits to a person 
contemplating a harmful act, the higher should be the sanction, for higher 
benefits require higher sanctions to deter.”90 For example, it is certainly 
more difficult for an individual confronted with an opportunity to steal 
$10,000,000 to resist the temptation than it is for an individual with an 
opportunity to steal only $10. Indeed, it is, at least in part, to compensate 
 
 
 88. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.10–5K2.13 (2005). 
 89. Some discussions of non-stranger violence portray the angry non-stranger offender as beyond 
reason and impossible to deter. See, e.g., SHERMAN, supra note 11, at 41 (“The police view is that 
unlike ‘rational’ crime, emotional violence cannot be deterred.”). One might think that an offender 
who is impossible to deter is incapable of controlling himself. However, as most individuals are 
capable of controlling themselves when angry and as the non-stranger offender almost certainly 
restrained himself from committing a violent act on other occasions when he was angry, the view of an 
angry offender as incapable of control is likely incorrect. See JEREMY HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME 89 
(2004) (“[E]ven though the intensity of an emotion reduces the degree of deliberative, rational control 
one has over one’s reaction, reason has yet a more active role to play.”). Cf. FORELL & MATTHEWS, 
supra note 21, at 162 (“Domestic violence . . . [is] not inevitable: Men who batter their intimates 
usually manage to contain their anger in other contexts, with other people.”). For a persuasive account 
of specific deterrence in domestic violence cases, see L.W. Sherman & R.A. Berk, The Specific 
Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984). 
 90. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 499 (2004). He 
goes on to explain: “There is, however, a limit to this relationship: If the benefits become so great that 
deterrence may not be possible, then the sanction should fall (and to zero if deterrence is impossible 
for all persons to whom the sanction would apply).” Id.; see also Posner, supra note 81, at 1993–94. 
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for the increased temptation to steal the larger amount of money that the 
penalty for stealing $10,000,000 is higher than the penalty for stealing 
$10.91 
Loss of control presents a similar problem. If a defendant is more likely 
to lose control of himself and commit a violent act when he is angry, then 
reducing penalties on the basis of an offender’s loss of control reduces 
punishment at the time that deterrence is most important.  
To be sure, other concerns may limit the amount the punishment should 
be increased to ensure adequate deterrence. For example, where the 
amount of punishment necessary to deter future offenses exceeds the 
amount of punishment that an offender “deserves,” the desire to treat the 
offender fairly may limit the amount of punishment.92 But that observation 
simply brings us back to the original question: Does the fact that it is more 
difficult for the non-stranger offender to control his violent actions than a 
comparable stranger offender mean that the non-stranger offender deserves 
less punishment? As the example of the different sums of money 
demonstrates, a greater desire to commit a crime does not necessarily 
decrease the amount of punishment that an offender deserves. Because 
difficulty to control oneself does not provide a definitive answer about 
what an offender deserves, it seems logical to revert to the basic 
framework of the provocation defense and examine why the non-stranger 
offender is angry with and wishes to act violently towards his victim. 
Several commentators have noted that legal evaluations of an 
offender’s emotions include a moral component.93 It is this moral 
evaluation that has, for example, led some courts to refuse to permit a 
defendant who killed in response to a homosexual advance to present a 
provocation defense.94  
[Those courts] do not assume that the asserted provocations were 
insufficient to destroy the defendants’ volition; indeed, many of 
these cases have excluded expert psychiatric testimony designed to 
 
 
 91. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2005) (increasing offense 
level based on amount of financial loss). The penalty is higher not only for deterrent purposes, but also 
to account for greater loss to the victim. 
 92. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 90, at 539 (“From the deterrence perspective, for example, we 
may want to impose a ten-year prison sentence on a car thief because the odds of finding him are quite 
low, but the demand for retribution . . . may well limit the sentence to a lesser level.”). 
 93. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 84; Nourse, supra note 83; see also Posner, supra note 
81, at 1980 (“[E]motion is never a fully sufficient excuse; the reason for the emotional reaction always 
matters.”); PILLSBURY, supra note 27, at 103–04 (“[E]motion should not be considered a monolithic 
force in responsibility; it must be closely analyzed for moral content. . . . [T]he degree of passion or 
dispassion does not prove a reliable measure of culpability.”). 
 94. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 84, at 310. 
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show exactly that. Rather, they deem the provocations insufficient 
because they conclude that the law should criticize rather than 
endorse the evaluation of the victim’s identity implicit in the 
defendant’s rage.95 
Examples of other situations where a defendant’s desire to commit a 
violent act was heightened and his ability for self-control weakened further 
illustrate the moral component of these legal evaluations. We would not 
decrease the punishment for a racist who assaults an African American on 
the theory that his racial hatred made it more difficult for the offender to 
control himself.96 But we would likely wish to decrease the punishment of 
the father who kills his daughter’s rapist. Both actors’ self-control is 
diminished by hate, but we accept the father’s hatred as legitimate and 
reject the racist’s hatred as illegitimate.  
Because the reasons for an offender’s loss of self-control must 
withstand moral scrutiny―a loss of control alone is insufficient―the 
stereotypes associated with non-stranger violence do not necessarily 
indicate that the non-stranger offender is less culpable. In other words, the 
mere fact that the offender acted in circumstances that provide context for 
the violence is not sufficient to justify less serious treatment for non-
stranger offenders. Rather, each act of non-stranger violence must be 
evaluated through a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the anger 
that preceded the violent reaction was not only understandable, but also 
not inappropriate.97 One can easily imagine a series of interpersonal 
disputes where an offender’s anger that precipitates a loss of control is 
clearly warranted—e.g., two sons witness their mother’s boyfriend kill 
their mother, and they retaliate by killing him.98 One could similarly think 
 
 
 95. See id. at 310 n.172 (collecting cases). 
 96. Professor Dan Kahan gives the example of the white supremacist who kills out of racial 
hatred and the mother who kills a man who has sexually abused her child. “Both acts are wrong, and 
their consequences are in some sense equivalent—there is one dead person in each case. Nevertheless, 
the racist’s killing is more worthy of condemnation precisely because his hatred expresses a more 
reprehensible valuation than does the mother’s anger.” Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598 (1996). 
 97. Cf. Dressler, supra note 81, at 989 (noting that in provocation cases, the jury’s evaluation of 
the triggering event is whether the event “‘justifies’ or ‘excuses’ the defendant’s anger (something that 
either makes us feel that anger is appropriate or, at least, understandable)”). 
 98. This example is drawn from the shooting death of Emmanuel Allen in July 2006. Allen was 
romantically involved and living with a woman named Vilma Rosario, a resident of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant neighborhood in New York City. Allen and Rosario had a volatile relationship: police had 
been called to Allen’s apartment on at least one previous occasion for a fight between the couple, and, 
according to Rosario’s sons, Allen’s abusive behavior toward Rosario has worsened during the course 
of their three-year relationship. One Friday night, Allen showed up drunk at Rosario’s apartment, 
began to harass her, and ultimately shot her in the head, killing her. Rosario’s sons, who were present 
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of a series of disputes where the anger that precedes a loss of control is 
significantly less warranted—e.g., the mother who hits her child who will 
not stop crying. It is only when the reasons for the offender’s anger can 
withstand moral scrutiny that his violent reaction is less culpable. 
One other point about loss of control and culpability deserves mention: 
it is best to err on the side of underinclusion for the category of disputes 
that are considered mitigating. Once we recognize the moral dimension of 
this doctrine, any decision to mitigate punishment based on a loss of self-
control smacks of tacit approval of violent impulses. A trivial argument 
between friends, for example, that escalates into violence should not be 
deemed appropriate. Were we to treat the offender who punches his friend 
less seriously than a comparable stranger, implicit in that decision is a 
partial endorsement of using violence to settle arguments between friends. 
2. Non-stranger Offender Motivated by Anger 
The second version of the culpability argument is that an individual 
who is motivated by anger is less culpable. The stereotypes driving this 
argument are that the non-stranger offender acts violently because he is 
motivated by anger, and that his violence is an expression of that anger. In 
contrast, the stereotypical stranger offender calculatingly uses violence as 
an instrument, and rather than acting out of anger he is fueled by baser 
motives, usually financial gain.99 Motive has long been considered an 
 
 
in the apartment, responded by stabbing and shooting Allen to death. According to news reports, 
Rosario’s sons were initially detained by the police but then released. See Kareem Fahim & Ann 
Farmer, Woman’s Killer Was Slain by Sons, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at 27, available at 
2006 WLNR 12653573; Samuel Bruchey, Man Kills Girlfriend; Sons Retaliate, Cops Say, NEWSDAY, 
July 23, 2006, at A16, available at 2006 WLNR 12657191; Georgett Roberts, Perry Chiaramonte & 
Lukas I. Alpert, Mom-Slay Revenge; Two Brothers Kill ‘Abuse’ Beau with Pistol & Saber, N.Y. POST, 
July 23, 2006, at 7, available at 2006 WLNR 12826418. The day after the shooting, “[a] spokesman 
for the Brooklyn district attorney said the shooting was still under investigation,” Fahim & Farmer, 
supra, but subsequent accounts continued to report that no charges were filed against the sons. See 
Man who Killed Lover Allegedly Killed by Sons, ALBANY TIMES UNION, July 24, 2006, at A3 (“No 
charges have been filed against the sons.”). 
 99. For example, in robberies, which unlike other violent crimes are disproportionately 
committed by strangers, see supra note 5, offenders use violence or the threat of violence in order to 
obtain something of value. Robbery is “[t]he illegal taking of property from the person of another, or 
in the person’s presence, by violence or intimidation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (7th ed. 
1999). Cf. Decker, supra note 17, at 537 (“Robbery is the textbook example of an instrumental crime 
involving an offender who seeks to maximize gain or advantage while minimizing risk of 
apprehension. Stranger homicides traditionally have been defined as instrumental events. Expressive 
events, on the other hand, fail to include the ‘rationality’ of such cost/benefit considerations. Instead, 
expressive or impulsive actions arise from ‘character contests’ to establish ‘face’ or from the desire to 
retaliate or redeem esteem or to express rage. These typically have been classified as nonstranger 
homicides; the classic example is the slaying of a spouse or lover, though these categories also could 
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important component of a defendant’s culpability,100 and financial gain is 
one of the motives most often identified as aggravating for sentencing 
purposes.101 
There are two problems with this argument. First there is a flaw in the 
assumption that a non-stranger uses violence to express himself and not as 
an instrument. When an individual resorts to violence within an existing 
personal relationship, it does not mean the violent actions are purely 
expressive—the individual does not act violently simply to demonstrate 
that he is angry. Rather, violence in relationships is often used 
instrumentally, i.e., to achieve certain ends. Domestic violence advocates 
have long contended that an abuser uses violence to “control his wife or 
lover, to gain compliance with his demands.”102 Violence in non-domestic 
personal disputes is likely also used instrumentally. Consider one friend 
who insults another, resulting in the insulted friend punching the other. 
The offender throws the punch not only because he felt insulted by the 
remark, but also to set certain boundaries to ensure that the friend does not 
insult him in the future. In punching his friend, the offender is defining the 
relationship as one in which such personal insults are not tolerated. 
Financial gain may be considered an aggravating motive for violent 
crimes because it seems particularly depraved to use violence as an 
instrument to obtain certain ends. But a person who acts out of anger is 
 
 
include the killing of a friend.”); Rojek & Wilson, supra note 58, at 257 (“[S]tranger homicides reflect 
a certain instrumental nature. . . . On the other hand, family and acquaintance homicide are more often 
expressive or emotive in nature, with little rational input.”). 
 100. See Hessick, supra note 87, at 101 (“It is generally understood that a sentencing judge may 
impose a shorter sentence on a defendant because he was acting with good motives, or a rather high 
sentence because of his bad motives. Published reports of the practice date back at least to the 
beginning of the 20th century.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 101. For example, Elizabeth Rapaport has identified this motive as one of “five aggravating 
factors which are among the most frequently included in modern death penalty statutes.” Elizabeth 
Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 501, 
526–27 (1990); see also Hessick, supra note 87, at 102–03 (“Many state capital sentencing schemes 
classify pecuniary gain as an aggravating sentencing factor. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
provide for sentencing enhancements when defendants who commit certain non-financial crimes, such 
as aggravated assault or trafficking in material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor, are 
motivated by pecuniary gain. The Federal Guidelines also provide sentencing reductions where a 
crime that would ordinarily be committed for pecuniary gain, such as criminal infringement of 
copyright or trademark, is committed for a non-financial motive.”). 
 102. Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men who Batter/Men who Kill, 2 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 85 (1992). “[M]uch of current literature on battering notes that the 
violence, contrary to earlier psychoanalytic explanations, is instrumental rather than expressive. In 
other words, the violence is not only an expression of rage, but serves a purpose.” Id. (citing James 
Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 133, 142–51 
(Kersti Yllö & Michele Bograd eds., 1988), and R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, The Nature 
and Antecedents of Violent Events, 24 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 269, 274 (1984)). 
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essentially acting out of a desire to cause someone harm or to inflict 
injury.103 A person who uses violence specifically to hurt his victim is 
arguably more blameworthy than one who uses violence to obtain 
money;104 the financially motivated offender may have used violence only 
as a last resort to obtain his desired ends, while the offender who acts out 
of anger is motivated by a specific desire to harm his victim.105 
When violence is used instrumentally to achieve particular ends within 
a personal relationship, such as to establish control or to define 
boundaries, it is difficult to meaningfully distinguish between the 
culpability of the motives behind stranger and non-stranger violence. Even 
though the motive of anger is different than the motive of financial gain, it 
is not clear that a financial motive is more blameworthy. Of course, the 
real distinction between the stranger and non-stranger offender may be not 
that we believe anger or the desire to inflict pain are more sympathetic 
motives than the desire for financial gain, but rather that we assume that 
the offender’s anger at the victim was, for some reason, appropriate—an 
issue that is discussed more fully below in the context of victim fault.106 
B. Offender Dangerousness 
Another potential justification for the view that non-stranger violence 
should not be treated as seriously as stranger violence is based on 
assumptions about offender dangerousness. A non-stranger offender is 
perceived as less dangerous than a stranger offender because the non-
stranger does not seem to be a threat outside of the specific relationship in 
which the violence occurred.107 As one commentator put it: 
 
 
 103. Cf. Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507, 513 
(1993) (“[M]any would question the proposition that an offender motivated by prejudice is more 
culpable than one motivated by greed, spite, or pure sadism.”). 
 104. Cf. Hessick, supra note 87, at 103–04 (“Many capital sentencing statutes include a provision 
that identifies a murder that ‘was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel’ or a murder that ‘manifest[ed] 
exceptional depravity’ as an aggravating factor. Several judicial decisions (and at least one legislative 
act) have indicated that this aggravating factor assesses the defendant’s motive at the time of the 
killing, focusing on whether the defendant ‘intended to inflict mental anguish, serious physical abuse, 
or torture upon the victim prior to the victim’s death.’”). 
 105. This may explain the evidence that non-stranger violence leads to greater victim injuries than 
stranger violence. See infra notes 200–06 and accompanying text. 
 106. See discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
 107. See Robert C. Davis & Barbara E. Smith, Crimes Between Acquaintances: The Response of 
Criminal Courts, 6 VICTIMOLOGY 175, 183 (1981) (noting that while non-stranger offenders “did, 
indeed, seem to pose less of a threat to the community at large, . . . they may have posed a greater 
threat to individual victims”); Levine, supra note 9, at 702 (“Persons who victimize strangers . . . are 
perceived and portrayed as predators: they threaten or attack at random, which makes them more of a 
threat to the community in the future. . . . These stereotypes suggest that persons who victimize 
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[R]elationship cases may be perceived as involving “private” justice 
because the defendant harmed, and may represent a continuing 
threat to an isolated individual. Stranger-to-stranger cases, however, 
may be thought of as involving “public” justice because the 
defendant is perceived to have harmed the community at large, and 
may represent a continuing threat to all members of the 
community.108 
This view of non-stranger offenders as less dangerous is based on two 
assumptions: the first is that a non-stranger offender is less likely to 
reoffend than a stranger offender; the second is that, if a non-stranger 
offender does reoffend, only his previous victim is at risk, while a stranger 
offender’s next victim could be any member of the public. There is at least 
some evidence that supports each of these assumptions. But the evidence 
is far from uniform or conclusive. 
Moreover, even if the assumptions that a non-stranger is less likely to 
reoffend and that only his prior victim is at risk were true, the assumptions 
would justify more serious treatment of stranger violence only under a 
theory of incapacitation.109 As discussed below, some of the available data 
indicate that treating non-stranger violence as a criminal matter improves 
the specific deterrence effect on individual offenders. And even assuming 
that non-stranger offenders are dangerous to a fewer number of potential 
victims than are stranger offenders, concerns about repeated violence 
towards vulnerable victims may increase our assessment of a non-stranger 
offender’s culpability. 
1. Recidivism 
The assumption that a non-stranger offender is unlikely to commit a 
subsequent act of violence is predicated on the stereotype of the non-
stranger offender as an otherwise law-abiding citizen whose anger got the 
better of him during an argument with a friend or family member.110 His 
violent behavior is viewed as an abnormal incident that will never be 
 
 
intimates, as compared with those who victimize strangers, . . . will be less likely to commit future 
criminal actions against random people. The intimate assailant may continue to be a threat to his 
intimate partner, friends, or family members, but he presents little or no danger to the rest of us.”). 
 108. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 4. 
 109. Incapacitation, as a goal of punishment, aims to deal with “dangerous” offenders or repeat 
offenders by making them incapable of offending again for long periods of time. ANDREW 
ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 68 (3d ed. 2000). 
 110. See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 21, at 189 (noting that courts often view “‘provoked’ 
men who kill their intimates . . . as not inherently violent, as posing no threat to society”). 
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repeated. In contrast, the stereotypical stranger offender is assumed to be a 
predator who repeatedly attacks unwitting victims.111  
Sex offender registries present one example of assumptions regarding 
family and other non-stranger dangerousness shaping criminal justice 
policy. As mentioned above,112 various state sex offender registries 
distinguish between child molesters on the basis of offender-victim 
relationship. New Jersey, for example, classifies family member assaults 
as “low risk,” assaults by acquaintances and within other social and 
business relationships as “moderate risk,” and stranger assaults as “high 
risk” for recidivism purposes.113 According to the state’s manual for 
classifying sex offenders, an offender’s previous relationship with his 
victim “is related to the likelihood of reoffense (with intrafamilial 
offenders having the lowest base rate of reoffense) as well as risk to the 
community at large.”114 Several commentators have disputed the accuracy 
of this claim, noting that “the low reoffense rate among incest offenders 
might be due to other factors, such as pressure on victims not to report, 
and the unwillingness of law enforcement to pursue familial abuse charges 
aggressively”115 and that more recent studies suggest that incest offenders 
 
 
 111. These stereotypes, of course, are not absolute. Drug offenders or gang members are 
presumed to often act violently towards non-stranger victims with similar drug or gang backgrounds. 
Cf. Keith Harries, A Victim Ecology of Drug-Related Homicide, in HOMICIDE: THE VICTIM/OFFENDER 
CONNECTION 397, 406 (Anna Victoria Wilson ed., 1993) (noting that drug homicides are more likely 
to involve acquaintances rather than family members or strangers). These non-stranger offenders likely 
pose a much greater recidivism risk. 
 112. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
 113. The Manual gives the following specific examples: 
Low risk example: sexually abuses younger sibling, household member, biological child, 
stepchild, or common law spouse’s child; offender sexually abuses family member who does 
not live in the household. 
Moderate risk example: “acquaintance” implies a degree of social/business interaction beyond 
that of a single contact and includes an offender who sexually abuses a neighbor’s child, a 
child for whom he or she is babysitting, or a child for whom he or she is coach or teacher; 
offender performs coercive sexual acts with date (“date rape”). 
High risk example: sexually abuses child or adult stranger accosted on street, in park, or in 
schoolyard; offender lures stranger (either adult or child) into coercive sexual activity; 
offender meets victim in bar and later assaults. Use of the word “stranger” does not 
automatically preclude fact situations in which the victim knows the identity of the offender, 
for example, the offender and victim may have had an exchange of words in a bar or social 
setting. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES, supra note 55, EXHIBIT E, at 5. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 267, 291–92 
(2006) (“Studies have shown that the closer the relationship between victim and offender, the less 
likely the act will be reported to police, and the less likely it is to be successfully prosecuted through 
the criminal justice system.”); Ruby Andrew, Child Sexual Abuse and the State: Applying Critical 
Outsider Methodologies to Legislative Policymaking, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1851, 1873–76 (2006) 
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have higher recidivism rates than originally believed.116 And even if the 
statement that intra-family sex offenders have the lowest rates of 
recidivism is correct, it does not explain the decision to categorize 
acquaintances, including coaches, teachers, neighbors, and babysitters, as 
moderate risk rather than as high risk, which is the category reserved for 
strangers.117 It is certainly plausible that an individual who used his 
position as a teacher, babysitter, or coach to sexually assault a child in his 
care may have chosen that position in order to have access to children.118 
To be sure, there is at least some evidence supporting the general 
assumption that non-stranger offenders are less likely to commit a future 
crime than stranger offenders. For example, a 1970s study of 295 cases in 
Brooklyn Criminal Court found that “defendants in cases involving 
acquaintances were . . . rearrested significantly less often during an 18-
month period following case disposition than defendants in stranger-to-
stranger cases.”119 But the evidence is not uniform. A more recent study 
from Arizona, which asked inmates to report on their own criminal 
histories, “did not yield significant differences in the number of offenses 
stranger and nonstranger offenders report committing.”120 Data from 
several other studies show that, while some offenders who act violently 
 
 
(“[C]laims about lower rates of recidivism in related offenders overlook the fact that intrafamilial 
child sexual abuse perpetrators are less likely to be caught a second time in comparison to stranger 
offenders. After all, a victimized child who observes that the state has decided to forgo any significant 
penalty for the related offender (or even has decided to allow the offender to return to the child’s 
home) will not be likely to voice a subsequent complaint of abuse.”). 
 116. Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System’s 
Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REV. 131, 164–66 (2007) (collecting 
sources for the proposition that “researchers are increasingly rebutting” the assumptions that “sexual 
abusers who victimize family members are less dangerous because they are both more amenable to 
treatment and less likely to reoffend”); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse: Evaluating the 
Danger Posed by a Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim’s Siblings, 51 EMORY L.J. 241, 245–46, 
256–63 (2002) (same). 
 117. Although the New Jersey manual cites a series of studies for its conclusions about the likely 
recidivism of intra family offenders, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES, supra note 55, EXHIBIT E at 3 
n.3, it does not appear to provide any support for its decision to classify acquaintance molesters as less 
likely to reoffend than strangers. 
 118. Cf. Levine, supra note 9, at 717 (reporting study of prosecutorial discretion in statutory rape 
cases which found that prosecutors were more likely to treat offenses seriously if the offender abused 
“a position of trust or authority” such as “a clergyman, teacher, coach, camp counselor, foster parent, 
police officer, or other professional working in close proximity with youth” and noting that 
“prosecutors believe that exploiting a position of trust to gain sexual favors is a habit that is not easily 
broken; despite claims that ‘this is a one-time transgression and we truly love each other,’ it is likely 
that the offender has taken advantage of other victims in the past and will do so again in the future”). 
 119. Davis & Smith, supra note 107, at 183 (noting a rate of “0.49 rearrests per defendant in cases 
involving a prior relationship, versus 0.85 rearrests per defendant in stranger-to-stranger cases”). 
 120. Leonore M.J. Simon, The Victim-Offender Relationship, in THE GENERALITY OF DEVIANCE 
215, 225 (Travis Hirschi & Michael R. Gottfredson eds., 1994). 
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within a family or intimate relationship do resemble the stereotype 
described above and subsequently desist from future violence, others do 
not.121 A significant number of individuals who commit violence in a 
personal relationship commit a further violent act within the same 
relationship.122 Several studies have identified a discernable group of non-
stranger offenders, in which the victim and offender have “strong 
interpersonal ties (i.e., nuclear family members or lovers),” where violence 
not only persists, but often escalates into more serious forms of violence, 
including homicide.123 And some studies have found that individuals who 
commit violent acts within one personal relationship are likely to commit 
violent acts in subsequent personal relationships.124 
Intimate offenders may also differ in their receptiveness to criminal 
justice intervention. A series of studies examining the effect of different 
police responses to domestic violence found that police decisions to arrest 
domestic violence offenders, as compared to police decisions simply to 
separate or counsel the couple, consistently led to a decrease in future 
violent incidents for first time offenders and offenders who did not 
seriously injure their victims.125 On the other hand, those studies also 
 
 
 121. See Jeffrey Fagan, Cessation of Family Violence: Deterrence and Dissuasion, in FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 377, 382–83 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989) (distinguishing “persistent 
offenders” from “the ‘innocents’ or desisters”). 
 122. See, e.g., Christopher D. Maxwell, Joel H. Garner & Jeffrey A. Fagan, The Preventive Effects 
of Arrest on Intimate Partner Violence: Research, Policy and Theory, 2 CRIMINOLOGY AND PUB. 
POL’Y 51, 71 (2002) (noting that 40% of domestic violence offenders in a series of studies had a least 
one subsequent violent act toward the victim and that “the average suspect with at least one subsequent 
incident had committed about an average of seven new incidents of aggression against the same victim 
within just the first six months of follow-up”); Coker, supra note 102, at 89 (“Contrary to the popular 
image of the model citizen who one day goes berserk and kills a family member, police studies have 
consistently found that men who kill their female partners have a history of violent behavior. Roughly 
70% to 75% of domestic homicide offenders have been previously arrested and about 50% have been 
convicted for violent crimes.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Fagan, supra note 121, at 
397 (describing the “consistent finding that spousal abuse is often repeated and escalates in severity”). 
 123. Davis & Smith, supra note 107, at 184 (citing G.M. WILT, J.D. BANNON & R.K. BREEDLOVE, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: STUDIES IN DETROIT AND KANSAS CITY (1977)). 
 124. See Coker, supra note 102, at 84 (citing, inter alia, Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody 
Decisions in Families Experiencing Woman Abuse, SOC. WORK (Sept. 1993) (citing studies which 
indicate that the likelihood of a batterer abusing in a new relationship to be between 57% and 86%)); 
see also Fagan, supra note 121, at 392 (“Anecdotal data from victims and shelter workers suggest that 
violent spouses often seek out other victims if cut off from a battering relationship. They move on to 
other relationships and resume violence, albeit with another victim.”). 
 125. The first study to reveal the effect that arrest has in cases of family violence was conducted in 
Minneapolis in 1980. In that study, law enforcement officers responding to domestic violence calls 
would, according to a randomly determined pattern, respond in one of three ways: arrest the offender, 
counsel the parties on the scene, or separate the parties. In cases where police did not arrest the 
offender, 21% of individuals reoffended within six months. In contrast, only 14% of individuals 
arrested reoffended within that period. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific 
Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261, 263–67 (1984). 
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showed that “legal sanctions for more serious cases were less effective and 
possibly led to escalations in violence.”126 This difference has been 
explained as follows: 
For ‘domestic violence only’ men, their violence is instrumental in 
motivation. Legal and social sanctions will be more meaningful to 
this (usually) higher social status individual who has much to lose 
from social disclosure or punishment. . . . For the ‘generally’ violent 
men, who had longer histories of violence and arrest, desistance 
would need to occur through changes in cultural patterns as well as 
by raising the costs of their well-established behaviorial patterns. 
For them, violence may be expressive and less amenable to external 
control.127 
The results of these studies suggest that, while some non-stranger 
offenders do fit the stereotype that drives public assumptions about 
offender dangerousness—they are first-time offenders whose violence did 
not cause serious injury and who are less likely to offend in the future—
those are the very offenders whose recidivism can be significantly 
decreased through criminal justice involvement.128 Ironically, those non-
stranger offenders that the criminal justice system is unlikely to deter from 
future offenses―offenders who seriously injure their victims or who have 
 
 
 Subsequent to the Minneapolis study, replication studies were commissioned in six American 
cities to test whether the same deterrent effects would follow arrests in domestic violence cases. 
Maxwell, Garner & Fagan, supra note 122, at 54. Although widely referred to as “replication 
programs,” the subsequent studies did differ in several respects, including the number and frequency 
of victim interviews, as well as the rigor with which police responses (e.g., arrest versus counseling) 
were assigned. Id. at 54. While the results of those studies did not reveal as large of a deterrent effect 
as the Minneapolis study, they showed “consistently smaller rates of subsequent victimization and 
recidivism among the suspects assigned to the arrest treatment versus the nonarrest interventions.” Id. 
at 66. A statistically significant deterrent effect was observable only from victim interviews, which 
indicated that “arrest reduced the prevalence of new victimization by 25% and the incidents of 
victimization by 30%.” Id. at 64. Official criminal history data and official police records showed 
reductions that were not statistically significant. Id. at 64–66. Interestingly, the deterrent effect was 
most prevalent in situations where the offender had a higher socio-economic status and no prior history 
of violence. Id. at 67–68. 
 126. Fagan, supra note 121, at 394.  
 127. Id. at 393–94; see also Lisa A. Frisch, Research That Succeeds, Policies That Fail, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 209, 213 (1992) (“[T]he studies’ findings that unemployed, socially 
‘marginal’ batterers are not deterred by arrest is no more surprising than the fact that our entire justice 
system fails to deter the majority of socially marginal criminals from committing any crime.”). 
 128. This effect of criminal justice intervention is limited to arrest. No similar affect was found 
comparing cases at subsequent stages, e.g., prosecution, sentence length. See Elliott, supra note 28, at 
467 (“It should also be noted that there is no evidence in the Fagan et al. (1984) study that the deterrent 
effect of legal action increased with the stage of processing in the legal system or the potential severity 
of legal sanction.”). 
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a history of violence―are the non-stranger offenders who should be 
viewed as the most dangerous. 
2. Victim Selection 
The argument that stranger offenders are more dangerous than non-
stranger offenders is based not only on an assumption about recidivism, 
but also on an assumption about victim selection―that those offenders 
who are violent within personal relationships do not pose a danger to the 
community at large.129 The scarce empirical data available to test this 
presumption is almost exclusively limited to domestic violence 
offenders,130 and the implications of the data are not clear. Some studies 
have found “violent husbands to be significantly more likely than 
nonviolent husbands to be violent toward nonfamily members.”131 But 
whether non-stranger offenders pose as large a risk as stranger offenders to 
the general public is difficult to determine. One study of victimization 
patterns by violent spouses—the non-stranger offender most people would 
presume to have a preference for a particular victim—reported three types 
of violent offenders: (1) offenders who committed domestic violence only; 
(2) offenders who were violent only toward individuals outside their 
families, including strangers; and (3) offenders who committed “general 
violence,” that is, violence against persons both inside and outside of the 
family.132 The study found that “nearly 45 percent of the ‘generally’ 
violent men began their adult violence careers victimizing only strangers” 
but “rarely found men whose victim circles widened outward from the 
 
 
 129. See generally infra note 184 and accompanying text. Cf. Davis & Smith, supra note 107, at 
183 (noting that while non-stranger offenders “did, indeed, seem to pose less of a threat to the 
community at large, . . . they may have posed a greater threat to individual victims”). 
 130. For some sources indicating that child sex offenders who victimize family members do not 
limit their victim selection to only relatives, see Andrew, supra note 115, at 1875 n. 124; Collins, 
supra note 116, at 165–66; Peggy Heil et al., Crossover Sexual Offenses, 15 SEXUAL ABUSE 221, 221–
36 (2003) (examining study of incarcerated child sexual offenders, in which majority of offenders 
admitted to raping both related and nonrelated children); Wilson, supra note 116, at 258 n.69; see also 
Judith V. Becker, Offenders: Characteristics and Treatment, 4 SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 176, 177 
(1994) (“[I]t used to be assumed that incest offenders could be clearly separated from other child 
molesters, but current evidence indicates that a substantial percentage of child molesters offend in both 
spheres.”); Mark Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by Sex Offenders, 6 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 286–300 (1991) (reporting study of sex offenders, in which 
intrafamilial child sexual offenders self-reported high degree of “crossover” offenses, such as rapes of 
nonrelated children or adult women). 
 131. Hotaling et al., supra note 38, at 356 (cautioning that “this literature is difficult to interpret”). 
 132. See Fagan, supra note 121, at 392–95 (discussing Nancy Shields & Christine R. Hanneke, 
Patterns of Family and Non-family Violence: An Approach to the Study of Violent Husbands (1981) 
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 343 Hessick book pages.doc1/11/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
378 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:343 
 
 
 
 
family―few ‘domestic violence only’ men became violent over time 
toward strangers as well.”133 However, that study appears to have 
categorized its subjects on the basis of how often they victimized a 
particular group—that is to say, a person who committed significantly 
more domestic assaults than non-domestic assaults would be categorized 
as “domestic violence only” even though he was committing some crimes 
against persons outside his family.134 Because of this method of 
categorization, the study is of limited value in assessing whether the 
victim selection assumption is true. 
Accounts of how many domestic violence offenders also commit 
crimes against strangers vary. One study found that “50% of a sample of 
wife abusers reportedly had spent time in prison, and 33% of these prison 
terms were for violent offenses toward strangers.”135 A second study found 
that approximately 20% of battered women interviewed had husbands who 
“were violent with other individuals besides their wives.”136 A separate 
study revealed that those domestic violence offenders who seriously injure 
their victims are more likely to victimize strangers as well.137  
There is little reason to believe that this victim selection assumption 
applies outside the context of domestic violence, such as in the context of 
violence between friends. That is because the assumption relies on the 
uniqueness of the offender-victim relationship. An offender’s domestic 
relationships are, by their very nature, limited in scope. The offender 
 
 
 133. Fagan, supra note 121 at 392. 
 134. An article subsequently published by the two authors whose unpublished paper Fagan 
describes, see supra note 132, explained its methodology as follows: 
If the respondent was violent with both family and nonfamily targets, then the following 
procedure was used to make a classification: The target with whom the respondent had been 
violent most often (in terms of the number of violent behaviors) became the man’s “most 
severe target.” The man had to be more than one-half as violent with any other target 
(compared with the severe target) to be used in determining the overall pattern of violence. 
For example, if the respondent’s most severe category was friends, but he was also at least 
half as violent with his wife, then he was classified as “generally” violent. However, if the 
violence with his wife was not at least half as severe as with friends, then he was considered a 
“nonfamily only” violent husband. 
Nancy M. Shields et al., Patterns of Family and Nonfamily Violence: Violent Husbands and Violent 
Men, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 83, 86 (1988). 
 135. Jeffrey Fagan & Sandra Wexler, Crime at Home and in the Streets: The Relationship 
Between Family and Stranger Violence, 2 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 5, 9 (1987). 
 136. Id. Other estimates range from 20% to almost 50%. See Leonore M.J. Simon, A Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Approach to the Legal Processing of Domestic Violence Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 43, 55 n.80 (1995) (collecting sources). 
 137. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Violent Men or Violent Husbands? Background Factors and Situational 
Correlates, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983) (reporting that spouses 
with histories of severe violence at home are more often violent toward strangers, have more often 
been arrested for violent offenses, and more often injure both domestic and stranger victims). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
p 343 Hessick book pages.doc1/11/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] VIOLENCE BETWEEN LOVERS, STRANGERS, AND FRIENDS 379 
 
 
 
 
whose violent actions are limited to domestic relationships will limit his 
victim selection to a finite number of victims, e.g., his romantic partner, 
children, etc. In contrast, an individual who acts violently toward his 
friends or acquaintances has a larger pool of potential victims because he 
is likely to have more friends and acquaintances. 
But even if the assumption about victim selection were true—that is, 
even if intimate and family offenders pose a risk only to members of their 
families and to their intimate partners—at most the assumption of victim 
selection supports an incapacitation argument in favor of more serious 
treatment of stranger violence.138 Under alternative theories of 
punishment, the victim selection assumption arguably supports greater 
punishment for non-stranger offenders. For example, one could argue that 
an offender who poses an identifiable risk to the same person or persons 
should be subject to more serious treatment because his targeting of a 
vulnerable victim makes him more culpable. That argument is essentially 
as follows: we generally increase the punishment of offenders who target 
vulnerable victims, such as the elderly or children.139 This practice is 
based on the theories that (a) a vulnerable victim is less capable of 
defending herself, and thus the violence may result in greater harm,140 and 
(b) the offender’s targeting of such victims shows an extra measure of 
depravity.141 Repeat victims of family violence are obviously at risk and 
vulnerable to future acts of violence, and thus an offender’s repeated 
targeting of such victims is arguably more blameworthy.142 
C. Victim Fault 
The third argument in favor of treating stranger violence more 
seriously is based on a perception that the victim may have been at least 
partially at fault. As Professor Kay Levine explains: 
 
 
 138. “For incapacitation, the issue is the risk posed by the offender to the general public, rather 
than the harm done to any particular victim in the past.” Martin Wasik, Crime Seriousness and the 
Offender-Victim Relationship in Sentencing, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 103, 104 
(Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998). 
 139. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2005) (providing for two-level 
increase for any offense where the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense 
was “unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who [was] otherwise 
particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct”). 
 140. See Wasik, supra note 138, at 113. 
 141. See id. (quoting United States v. Moore, 897 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
 142. See id. at 116 (“[A recent decision] that an assault committed in a domestic setting should be 
sentenced on the same basis as any other assault (i.e. rather than more leniently) . . . does not go far 
enough. Are not abused women almost archetypal ‘vulnerable victims,’ so that attacks upon them 
should justify enhanced rather than reduced sentencing levels?”). 
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Persons who victimize strangers thus are perceived and portrayed as 
predators: they threaten or attack at random . . . . [In contrast], the 
victim who knows her assailant may be perceived as having 
somehow incited the assailant’s behavior, which under the legal 
doctrine of provocation may lessen the assailant’s culpability. These 
stereotypes suggest that persons who victimize intimates, as 
compared with those who victimize strangers, cause less 
(undeserved) harm to their victims . . . .143 
Victim fault can take two forms: First, the victim may have actively 
engaged in aggressive (or, in any event, affirmative) behavior that 
provoked or goaded the offender into a violent act. Second, a victim may 
have passively failed to act by not ending a relationship with a violent 
offender or otherwise taking precautions to avoid violent situations.144  
1. Active Victim Fault 
The victim whose behavior affirmatively triggers a violent response is 
a well-known image. This figure appears in the provocation defense145 and 
is generally thought to be entitled to less protection than other victims. The 
idea is that, because the victim is guilty of some intensely disfavored 
conduct, such as assaulting the offender, the offender’s violent outburst is 
partially justified.146 Although it ordinarily arises in the context of 
aggressive conduct that prompts the offender’s violence, the notion of 
active victim fault likely plays an important role in other decisions to treat 
non-stranger violence less seriously. For example, assaults between two 
members of the drug trade or between a prostitute and her pimp are 
unlikely to receive the same moral condemnation as a similar assault on an 
“innocent” victim.147 
 
 
 143. Levine, supra note 9, at 702. 
 144. See James J. Gobert, Victim Precipitation, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 511, 514 (1977) (defining 
“victim precipitation” of a crime as “some overt, identifiable conduct or omission on the part of the 
victim which provokes an individual to commit a crime”). 
 145. See generally supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 146. There is considerable debate among criminal law theorists over whether the provocation 
defense is properly characterized as a justification or as an excuse. For a summary of this debate, see 
Dressler, supra note 81.  
 Here, the argument about victim fault focuses exclusively on the victim’s wrongdoing. In light of 
this, and in light of the discussion of offender culpability, supra, and the important moral component 
necessary to mitigate an offender’s punishment, for the purposes of this Article I have elected to 
characterize the victim fault argument as a partial justification. 
 147. See Wasik, supra note 138, at 113 (noting that the “‘ideal victim’ identified in criminological 
literature . . . is upright, innocent, passive, and morally uncompromised, displaying contrasting 
characteristics to those of the offender”); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
p 343 Hessick book pages.doc1/11/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] VIOLENCE BETWEEN LOVERS, STRANGERS, AND FRIENDS 381 
 
 
 
 
Leaving aside the non-stranger victim who is engaged in unrelated 
criminal activity, the image of the non-stranger victim whose actions 
resulted in violence is reminiscent of the provoking victim, whose 
affirmative conduct partially justifies the provoked offender. While the 
non-stranger violence victim need not have legally provoked the offender 
(i.e., engaged in behavior considered to provide “adequate provocation”), 
and while the offender need not have actually killed the non-stranger 
victim,148 the provoking victim and the non-stranger victim are viewed 
similarly in that their behavior is believed to have caused the offender’s 
violence. Consider the non-stranger victim who, in the course of a verbal 
argument with an acquaintance at a bar, says something very offensive to 
the acquaintance; in response, the acquaintance punches the victim in the 
face. It is unlikely the offender would have been entitled to the 
provocation defense had he killed the victim. Yet we recognize that the 
offender would not have hit the victim had the victim not made the 
offensive comment,149 and we tend to view this victim as less deserving of 
protection than a victim who, while walking down the street and minding 
her own business, was suddenly punched in the face by a complete 
stranger. At the very least, we intuit that the “innocent” victim walking 
down the street deserves more protection from violence than the victim 
who is making offensive comments in bars. 
 
 
STAN. L. REV. 937, 951 (1985) (“In the criminal law context, the word ‘victim’ has come to mean 
those who are preyed upon by strangers: ‘Victim’ suggests a nonprovoking individual hit with the 
violence of ‘street crime’ by a stranger. The image created is that of an elderly person robbed of her 
life savings, an ‘innocent bystander’ injured or killed during a holdup, or a brutally ravaged rape 
victim. ‘Victims’ are not prostitutes beaten senseless by pimps or ‘johns,’ drug addicts mugged and 
robbed of their fixes, gang members killed during a feud, or misdemeanants raped by cellmates.”); see 
also Sundby, supra note 75, at 354–55 (“[T]hose victim attributes that correlate with a life sentence—
drug use, alcohol abuse, unstable personality—tend to manifest themselves in the cases through 
evidence of victim behavior that can be termed ‘high risk’ or ‘antisocial.’ . . . By contrast, victims 
perceived by jurors as possessing more ‘worthy’ attributes are found in fact patterns in which the 
victim was an ‘innocent’ minding her own business, a fact pattern that . . . correlates strongly with a 
sentence of death.”). 
 148. Provocation is only a partial defense—allowing a provoked offender to be convicted of 
manslaughter rather than murder, but not to escape criminal liability altogether—and is permitted only 
in homicide cases. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow what is essentially a provocation defense 
for all violent crimes. The Guidelines include an evaluation of active victim fault: “If the victim’s 
wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court may reduce 
the sentence below the guideline range to reflect the nature and the circumstances of the offense.” U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2006). 
 149. See Gobert, supra note 144, at 528–30, 544 (discussing the causative role of victim fault and 
arguing that there are “degrees of causation, and the strength of the causal link between the 
precipitative conduct and the defendant’s crime should be relevant to the amount of sentence 
mitigation, with reservation of the greatest mitigation for cases in which the causal relationship is 
strongest”). 
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What distinguishes these hypothetical situations and our relative 
perceptions of the two victims is not whether their attacker was a stranger 
before the violent incident. Had the first hypothetical victim made the 
same comment to someone he did not know, rather than to an 
acquaintance, it would unlikely change our assessment of which victim 
was more deserving of protection. Rather, what matters is whether the 
victim’s conduct triggered the violence. We also care about the nature of 
the victim’s conduct: whether someone believes the conduct of the first 
hypothetical victim is relevant to judging the offender’s crime will likely 
depend on what the victim said. Had the first victim merely told his 
acquaintance to shut up, the victim’s plight would seem more sympathetic 
than if, for example, the victim had made a comment disparaging the 
offender’s race or religion.150 
But the nature of this example may be obscuring intuitive distinctions 
regarding whether the victim and offender are acquainted prior to the 
violent act. It is difficult to picture an individual suddenly maligning a 
complete stranger. An offensive comment is far more likely to occur in a 
preexisting relationship.151 It may, therefore, limit our ability to determine 
whether a victim-offender relationship ordinarily affects our assessment of 
victim fault.  
Road rage shootings provide a useful example that avoids this problem. 
Road rage shootings involve the same kind of trivial victim fault that is 
perceived to precipitate non-stranger violence, but road rage incidents are 
perceived to be committed primarily by strangers. The public response to 
road rage freeway shootings illustrates the striking role that a victim-
offender relationship can play. News accounts of the shootings often 
include details of the victim’s conduct that caused the offender’s excessive 
retaliation152—such as one driver cutting off another,153 making a rude 
gesture,154 or minor traffic infractions and accidents.155 Non-stranger 
 
 
 150. Cf. Gobert, supra note 144, at 543 (“Some precipitative conduct may be so trivial that it 
should have no effect on a defendant’s sentence.”). 
 151. See Rojek & Wilson, supra note 58, at 257 (“The probability of an argument precipitating a 
stranger homicide is relatively low compared to family or acquaintance homicide.”). 
 152. See Robert F. Blomquist, American “Road Rage”: A Scary and Tangled Cultural-Legal 
Pastiche, 80 NEB. L. REV. 17 (2001) (collecting sources); see also id. at 47 (noting that a clinical 
psychologist who testified at congressional hearings on road rage “defined road rage ‘as one driver 
expressing anger at another driver for something he or she did on the road’”). 
 153. Id. at 20, 27, 29; Joel Best, “Road Warriors” on “Hair-Trigger Highways”: Cultural 
Resources and the Media’s Construction of the 1987 Freeway Shootings Problem, 61 SOC. INQUIRY 
327, 332 (1991). 
 154. Blomquist, supra note 152, at 27. 
 155. Id. at 27, 28. 
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shootings and homicides are regularly precipitated by similarly trivial 
disputes.156 Indeed, one highway patrol officer drew an explicit 
comparison between road rage shootings and non-stranger crime in a 
television interview: “These are difficult crimes to try to stop for law 
enforcement. These are ty―, these are crimes of passion which are akin to 
the types of crime that occur, uh, between family members.”157 
The public outcry following the highly publicized freeway shootings 
focused on the triviality of the incident that provoked the offending 
driver158 and thus on their relatively random nature. While road rage 
shootings are far outnumbered by non-stranger shootings and 
homicides,159 they have garnered a disproportionately large amount of 
public attention.160 These shootings prompted congressional hearings,161 
and several states introduced legislation to address road rage violence.162 
California enacted legislation that added five years to the prison sentence 
of “anyone convicted of shooting someone in a motor vehicle and causing 
serious injury or death.”163 Separate legislation forbade judges from 
imposing only a sentence of probation for offenders convicted of freeway 
violence and added more officers to highway patrol.164 Because the victim 
fault present in road rage incidents is so similar to the victim fault that is 
perceived to precipitate non-stranger violence, this reaction to road rage 
strongly suggests that victim fault, standing alone, does not justify treating 
stranger violence more seriously than non-stranger violence. 
2. Passive Victim Fault 
The second type of victim fault that might lead us to perceive non-
stranger violence as less serious than stranger violence involves the 
 
 
 156. See Best, supra note 153, at 332 (noting that a news report which described the events 
leading up to a freeway shooting as drivers “jockeying for position” “makes the shooting seem less 
random, less an irrational response, . . . and more like the escalating ‘character contests’ which often 
precede interpersonal violence”). 
 157. Id. at 333 (quoting NBC news story). 
 158. Blomquist, supra note 152, at 45 (quoting congressional testimony). 
 159. For figures on “roadway firearm assaults,” see Best, supra note 153, at 342 n.1. 
 160. Murder By Strangers: From Gang Gunfire to Freeway Shootings, L.A. County’s 1987 
Homicides Often Linked by Their Random Nature, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1987, at Part II page 1. 
 161. Blomquist, supra note 152, at 40–49 (describing 1997 hearings before the Surface 
Transportation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure). 
 162. Donald W. North, The Fury Within All of Us Yearning to Break Free: Road Rage Comes of 
Age, 27 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 183, 200 (2002). 
 163. Jerry Gillam, Bills Signed to Combat Violence on the Freeways, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1987 
at Part I page 21. 
 164. Best, supra note 153, at 333–34. 
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victim’s failure to protect herself from violence. That failure can take 
many forms, such as failing to end a relationship with an individual who is 
prone to violence or failing to take other precautions, such as locking 
one’s door at night. Because these victims failed to take appropriate 
precautions to avoid violence, one might argue that they deserve less 
protection than those victims who did take precautions. Indeed, 
commentators have ordinarily discussed the arguments for reducing an 
offender’s punishment on the basis of passive victim fault in the more 
general context of a failure to take precautions.165 
One argument that has been advanced in favor of reducing an 
offender’s punishment on the basis of passive victim fault is that if 
offenders are punished less harshly for committing crimes against careless 
victims, then potential victims will have an incentive to take precautions 
against crimes.166 The proponent of this theory has conceded that it should 
be limited to victims whose vulnerability to crime is voluntary.167 This 
concession would seem to exempt many victims of non-stranger crimes, 
whose victimization was attributable to factors over which they have 
limited control. There is a large body of research indicating that domestic 
violence victims, for example, are not psychologically capable of leaving 
their violent mates.168 The theory could also exempt individuals whose 
victimization was more likely because they live in high crime areas. 
Because those who live in high crime areas often do so because they do 
not have enough resources to live elsewhere, their vulnerability to crime is 
not entirely voluntary. 
Another variation on the idea of passive victim fault is the notion of 
consent. One might argue that a victim consents to violent behavior if that 
victim continues to maintain a personal relationship with the offender after 
the offender has already committed a violent crime against her. But there 
are several problems with this theory of victim consent. First, it cannot 
justify more lenient treatment of all non-stranger violence; by its own 
terms, it applies only in situations where an offender commits a violent 
crime against the same victim a second (or subsequent) time. Second, it 
assumes that all personal relationships are purely voluntary interactions. 
That is most certainly not so, for example, in cases of violence between 
 
 
 165. See generally Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal 
Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1183 (1994); Gobert, supra note 144. 
 166. Gobert, supra note 144, at 1196–97. 
 167. Id. at 1204–05. 
 168. For examples of this research, see the amicus briefs of the American Psychological 
Association and American Civil Liberties Union in State v. Kelly, reprinted in 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 245 (1986). 
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parent and child.169 Other family relationships or relationships based on 
close geographical proximity (e.g., neighbors) may also require more than 
simply the victim’s desire to end the relationship in order to sever all 
personal ties. 
The inadequacy of the consent theory can also be found in the 
treatment of repeated domestic violence that culminates in the death of the 
victim. If we assume that the victim’s decision to remain in the 
relationship gives the offender some sort of license to continue his actions, 
then we would not want to prosecute the offender even when his actions 
resulted in death. A sense that it is appropriate to prosecute these domestic 
violence homicides indicates that, at some point, we believe what the 
offender has done is wrong and deserves punishment, the victim’s desire 
to remain in the relationship notwithstanding. However, once we 
recognize that some incidents of “consenting” non-stranger violence are, 
in and of themselves, deserving of punishment, then it becomes necessary 
to articulate a justification for allowing other forms of non-stranger 
violence to be minimized or ignored. 
D. Non-stranger Crime as a Private Matter 
Historically, violence within relationships was viewed as a “private” 
matter.170 That view appears to persist today.171 This belief may explain 
the apparent preference of criminal justice actors to defer to the wishes of 
non-stranger victims and to pursue stranger crime regardless of the 
victim’s wishes.172 As other commentators have noted: 
[C]riminal justice actors view crime between acquaintances as 
essentially private matters between the two parties, rather than as 
public matters. In crimes between acquaintances, officials view the 
defendant as having harmed, and representing a continuing threat to, 
 
 
 169. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 40, at 1502–04. 
 170. Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of 
Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1161 & n.64 (collecting sources).  
 171. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 26, tbl.4.5 (2005) (noting that violence 
in the context of personal relationships is often not reported to the police because the victim perceives 
the matter as a personal or private matter or because the victim wishes to protect the offender); see 
also RIEDEL, supra note 5, at 178 (“Victims often regard their conflicts with family and friends, 
including violent ones, as matters that can be resolved without law.”); Simon, supra note 6, at 523 
n.237 (citing ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY 233 (2d ed. 
1990) for the proposition that “child sexual abuse cases that come to the attention of medical 
authorities are usually not turned over to the criminal justice system because families consider the 
incidents to be private matters”). 
 172. See infra notes 252–54 and accompanying text. 
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an isolated individual. Therefore, the decision to prosecute depends 
heavily on the victim’s interest; only if there is reasonable assurance 
that the victim wants to press charges, may the prosecutor and the 
court see a compelling reason to proceed with the case. In stranger-
to-stranger cases, on the other hand, the defendant is perceived by 
officials as having harmed the community at large, and is seen as 
representing a continuing threat to all members of the community. 
The interests of the individual victim are subordinate to the interest 
of the community (as those interests are interpreted by court 
officials). Therefore, victims are less likely to be consulted about 
their interests, and defendants are more likely to be prosecuted 
regardless of whether or not victims have indicated that that is what 
they wish.173 
The view of non-stranger violence as a private matter often 
encompasses a belief that such violence should be handled within the 
confines of the existing relationship or community, rather than through 
formal legal processes.174 Even those who do not advocate complete non-
intervention on the part of the state argue for non-criminal resolution of 
crimes involving close personal relationships in some circumstances.175 
The arguments in favor of this view are often framed in terms of the 
collateral consequences to the victim if the non-stranger offender is 
prosecuted. Those arguments include the economic hardship that will 
befall the victim if the offender is the head of household and his 
imprisonment will interfere with his earning potential.176 Arguments 
concerning the further damage to the victim-offender relationship or the 
offender’s relationship with other family members are also made. These 
“best for the family” type arguments are particularly prevalent in child 
 
 
 173. Davis & Smith, supra note 107, at 182–83 (citing James Bannon, Law Enforcement 
Problems With Intra-Family Violence (1975) (paper presented at the American Bar Association 
Convention) and B.E. Smith, The Prosecutor’s Witness: An Urban/Suburban Comparison (1979) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook)). 
 174. RIEDEL, supra note 5, at 178. Unfortunately, the idea that non-stranger violence is best 
resolved informally may also mask a belief that it is not worth the resources of the formal criminal 
justice system. Cf. CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 6, at 25 (“Not long ago there was a tendency to 
dismiss reports of all but the most serious offenses in slum areas and segregated minority group 
districts. The poor and the segregated minority groups were left to take care of their own problems.”).  
 175. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 804–05 (2007) 
(articulating the argument that a domestic violence victim is in the best position to know how to 
protect herself). 
 176. E.g., Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor 
Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1016–18 (2000); Tamara L. Kuennen, “No Drop” 
Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic 
Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 41 (2007). 
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molestation cases, where a premium is often placed in keeping the family 
together and trying to return the family to a normal situation.177 
There are two flaws with these arguments. First, while these informal 
social controls may have existed at some point, the modern decline of 
informal dispute mechanisms in specific communities has been well 
documented.178 Indeed, modern studies of crime have demonstrated a 
correlation between high rates of non-stranger violence and a lack of 
neighborhood support networks.179 
Second, the collateral economic and social consequences of criminal 
justice intervention for an offender’s family are not limited to the 
punishment of non-stranger violence. Some stranger offenders also have 
families, and imprisonment will disadvantage those families just as much 
as it would a non-stranger offender’s family. Thus, these collateral 
consequences cannot justify different treatment for stranger and non-
stranger violence. 
E. Fear of Strangers 
Another professed reason for treating stranger crime more seriously is 
that crimes committed by strangers cause more fear.180 Public concern 
 
 
 177. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 28, at 10–14 (describing the rise of the “therapeutic” approach, 
under which intrafamily child sex abuse was treated as a family problem rather than as a crime, and 
noting a more recent “concerted push toward criminal prosecution of these cases, although not without 
controversy”); Daniel G. Saunders & Sandra T. Azar, Treatment Programs for Family Violence, in 
FAMILY VIOLENCE 481, 490 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989) (noting a debate in the child 
abuse field over “whether family members should be separated after abuse is discovered” and further 
noting that some “professionals believe that greater trauma will occur to the victim if the family breaks 
up because of the loss of the parent, guilt for breaking up the family, and social and economic 
hardships for all family members”); see also Collins, supra note 116, at 167–71 (noting this argument 
and discussing its flaws); GRAY, supra note 28, at 115 (“[T]he therapeutic approach to intra-family 
cases of child sexual abuse—at least in the child welfare system—has not been very successful.”). 
 178. As Carolyn Ramsey has explained in the context of partner violence, “the network of 
relatives, neighbors, and friends who helped shield victims of intimate violence from their abusers had 
largely disintegrated” by the late nineteenth century, as “urban dwellers increasingly maintained a 
polite distance from their relatives and treated the family next door as strangers. Court records and 
prosecutors’ papers abound with evidence that both neighbors and relatives frequently ignored screams 
from family fights.” Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880–1920, 
77 U. COLO. L. REV. 101, 165 (2006); see also Davis & Smith, supra note 107, at 175 (“As family and 
community bonds have become weakened in modern industrial societies, informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms and structures have deteriorated.” (citing Laura Nader & Duane Metzger, Conflict 
Resolution in Two Mexican Communities, 65 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 584 (1963)). Cf. BRUCE H. 
MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987) 
(documenting the replacement of community dispute resolution by formal legal proceedings). 
 179. See, e.g., Rebecca Miles-Dolan, Violence Between Spouses and Intimates: Does 
Neighborhood Context Matter?, 77 SOC. FORCES 623 (1998). 
 180. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that felonies committed by 
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about crime is disproportionately directed at crimes committed by 
strangers.181 There is evidence suggesting that violent crimes committed 
by strangers are more likely to receive media coverage than non-stranger 
violence,182 though whether this media focus is a cause or an effect of 
public concern is not clear.183 The disproportionate public concern about 
stranger violence may be explained by perceptions of personal control. 
People tend to believe that they can avoid personal relationships with 
violent individuals and thus minimize their exposure to non-stranger 
crime. They know, by contrast, that they do not have similar control with 
respect to strangers. As Lawrence Friedman explains: 
Stranger violence is what people fear most―and as soon as we 
enter a “public environment,” we lose a lot of our power to “screen 
out undesirable social contacts.” Even the most innocuous setting 
can turn into a minefield: . . . a crazed man kills passengers on a 
suburban train; an ex-convict kidnaps a young girl from her own 
bedroom and murders her. These are truly terrifying events, because 
they suggest that nobody is safe anywhere. These particular types of 
crime are, in fact, pretty uncommon, but they send chills down our 
spine. They could happen to anyone. They come out of nowhere.184 
 
 
strangers “might be regarded as more serious and more frightening”); see also supra note 6. 
 181. See supra notes 6–7. 
 182. See, e.g., Best, supra note 153, at 337 (noting the press emphasis on “random” violence in 
freeway shootings, serial murderers, and strangers abducting children).  
 183. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 
1292 (2005) (“Because of the availability heuristic, through which people estimate how frequently an 
event occurs based on how easy it is to recall the event, when people think about the risk of crime and 
the appropriate sentence, they will think of the examples they get from the media. Thus, the public’s 
fears of crimes will be fueled by the media, and they will perhaps place greater stock in incarceration 
policies that promise to deal with their fears in the most immediate fashion.”); PILLSBURY, supra note 
27, at 65 (“Generally we fear most what we understand least. For example, residents of relatively safe 
suburbs often have much greater fear of crime than do those who live in more dangerous urban areas. 
We tend to fear certain highly unusual crimes of violence, like stranger kidnappings of children, than 
the much more common crimes of domestic violence. We often exaggerate the dangers posed by those 
of different races and classes.”). 
 184. Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Remarks on Crime, Violence, History, and Culture, 69 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1121, 1131–32 (1998); see also Elizabeth Rapaport, Mad Women and Desperate Girls: 
Infanticide and Child Murder in Law and Myth, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 545–46 (2006) (“As with 
all varieties of family violence, child abuse homicide does not arouse fear in the general public of the 
sort that lead to persistent demands for attention to public safely because the threat is perceived as 
confined to the family circle of the abuser. The brutal mother, father, or live-in boyfriend does not 
galvanize fear about danger to the community at large as does, for example, the pedophile lurking near 
the schoolyard or other criminal predator who is a stranger to the victim.”); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & 
GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 10 (1997) (“The 
more members of the public feel the risks of a particular harm are within their control, the more secure 
citizens will feel about their personal situation. But if potential victims feel there is no way they can 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/3
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Fear of crime can result in various expensive consequences, such as 
private money spent on crime prevention (e.g., burglar alarms, dead bolts, 
private security personnel) and opportunity costs (e.g., avoiding certain 
neighborhoods, not going out after dark).185 If fear of stranger violence 
results in a significant expenditure of resources, one might think that the 
allocation of additional resources to reduce stranger crime may be justified 
as an efficient response to public crime fears.186 But there are limitations 
to this resource allocation argument. Because the greater allocation of 
resources to preventing stranger violence would heighten arrest levels, 
prosecution rates, and sentence lengths for stranger offenders, this is not 
simply an argument for traditional resource allocation. Rather it is an 
argument about treating some criminal defendants differently. 
Any argument to treat some criminal defendants differently than others 
must overcome the modern criminal law’s preference for punishment 
equality.187 That preference will allow for disparate treatment of different 
defendants only when meaningful distinctions between defendants can be 
drawn.188 It is not clear that public fear, standing alone, can provide such a 
distinction. 
For one thing, there are certainly examples where public fear would 
suggest disparate treatment based on illegitimate criteria, such as race. 
Public opinion research indicates that individuals are more afraid of being 
 
 
take action to modify risks, this will heighten their anxiety about a particular risk. . . . [O]ne reason 
citizens fear stranger violence more than they fear being killed by friends or family is because they feel 
more control over their choice of personal acquaintances, while the strangers they encounter are not as 
easy to choose or to reject.”). Cf. Gobert, supra note 144, at 538–39 (“If the victim in a violent assault, 
for example, did nothing to bring about the crime, then the likelihood that the victim was randomly 
selected increases. In that event, everyone is a potential victim. On the other hand, if the victim was at 
fault to some extent, then those who do not precipitate crimes against themselves have less to fear. The 
result is that finding victim precipitation allows citizens to feel more secure about their chances of 
being victimized.”). 
 185. See Marc Reidel, Stranger Violence: Perspectives, Issues, and Problems, 78 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 223, 223–24 (1987). 
 186. Criminal justice resources include the time of police and prosecutors, as well as space within 
prisons. 
 187. See, e.g., HART, supra note 78, at 172 (discussing “the claim of justice that ‘like cases should 
be treated alike’”); Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment, and the Impact 
of Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 251, 253 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin 
Wasik eds., 1998) (arguing for a “general principal of equal treatment” of sentencing in order “to 
respect individuals by ensuring fair treatment”). 
 188. For discussions about the undesirability of “unwarranted disparity” in the criminal justice 
system, see, e.g., PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARDS A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 
1–15 (1977); Andrew Ashworth, Four Techniques for Reducing Sentence Disparity, in PRINCIPLED 
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 227, 236–37 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew 
Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998). 
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the victim of a crime committed by African Americans.189 But it is 
doubtful that many people would argue that such fear would justify 
disproportionately high arrests, prosecutions, or sentences for African 
American offenders. The same objection would apply to increased arrests 
and longer sentences based on an offender’s income, gender, or education 
level. 
Of course, these examples demonstrate only that public opinion and 
public reaction to certain crimes should not drive criminal justice resource 
allocation when the opinion and reaction are based on illegitimate criteria, 
such as race. But, as discussed above, there is reason to believe that public 
opinion and reaction to stranger crime is based, at least in part, on 
considerations of race and socioeconomic status, and it is hard to separate 
out these illegitimate bases.190 And even if we were to change the variable 
that causes public fear to some seemingly random criteria—offenders who 
commit crimes while wearing blue shirts, or offenders who are left-
handed—we can see that the preference for punishment equality makes the 
disparate arrest levels and sentence lengths based on these criteria seem 
illegitimate. 
Moreover, public fear about stranger violence is largely ungrounded in 
fact. Non-strangers commit the majority of violent crimes.191 If heightened 
public fear of stranger violence had some real factual support, then there 
could be utilitarian crime control reasons for disparate treatment. 
III. THE CASE FOR EQUAL TREATMENT OF NON-STRANGER VIOLENCE 
The previous Part of this Article discussed the possible justifications 
for treating stranger violence as more serious than non-stranger violence. 
This Part identifies independent arguments in favor of treating non-
stranger violence more seriously than it is presently treated. Those 
arguments include (1) non-stranger violence results in greater harm to 
victims than stranger violence, (2) the treatment of non-stranger violence 
as less serious than stranger violence is at odds with the legally recognized 
positive obligations that accompany close personal relationships, and (3) 
more serious treatment of non-stranger violence may be required to 
counterbalance the weaker social norms against such violence. 
 
 
 189. See Craig St. John & Tamara Heald-Moore, Racial Prejudice and Fear of Criminal 
Victimization by Strangers in Public Settings, 3 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 267, 268–69 (1996) 
(describing two studies which found that encounters with young African American males evoked 
especially high levels of fear for white study participants). 
 190. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
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A. Accounting for Greater, or at Least Additional, Victim Harm 
Criminal law ordinarily evaluates the seriousness of a crime according 
to two factors: the harm done by the offense and the offender’s 
culpability.192 While offender culpability may be slightly higher in some 
crimes of stranger violence,193 there is reason to believe that both the 
physical and psychological harm to at least some victims of non-stranger 
violence may be more serious than the harm to victims of comparable 
stranger violence. As discussed below, studies of victim harm—
specifically, studies of robberies and assaults—reveal that those who are 
victimized by an offender whom they know are more likely to suffer 
serious injury during the course of a crime than those victimized by 
strangers. Evidence also suggests that victims of non-stranger violence 
suffer other harms in addition to those suffered by victims of stranger 
crime. These additional harms include feelings that the victim was herself 
to blame for the violent incident or intimidation and other fears associated 
with knowing and being known to the offender. Finally, violent crimes 
that occur within the context of close personal relationships may involve a 
breach of trust and feelings of betrayal that would not arise had the same 
crime been committed by a stranger. 
The central role that victim harm plays in criminal liability is illustrated 
by the practice of classifying attempt as less serious than a completed 
crime. Consider the situation of the would-be murderer who shoots and 
misses. He has taken all necessary steps to complete a crime, and failed to 
complete the murder only for reasons that were beyond his control. The 
would-be murderer is just as culpable as the offender who actually 
completes the crime, just less successful.194 Yet most jurisdictions punish 
the would-be murderer less severely than the successful murderer, despite 
their identical culpability.195 
 
 
 192. “Crimes must be ranked according to their relative seriousness, as determined by the harm 
done or risked by the offence and by the degree of culpability of the offender.” Andrew Ashworth, 
Desert, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCINGS: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 141, 143 (Andrew von 
Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998). 
 193. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 194. Of course, offender culpability for attempt may arguably be less than for a completed crime 
if attempt liability is allowed in situations where the offender has not yet taken actions in substantial 
fulfillment of the crime—e.g., the attempted murderer who shoots and misses is arguably more 
culpable than the attempted murderer who has done no more than purchase a gun. 
 195. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW 
AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 544–45 (8th ed. 2007) (noting that “the usual punishment 
for attempt is a reduced factor of the punishment for the completed crime . . . however, a substantial 
minority of states have departed from the predominant scheme by making the punishment the same for 
the attempt as for the crime attempted, except for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment”). 
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Victim harm also plays a significant role in sentencing 
determinations.196 For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
increase a defendant’s sentence for financial crimes based on the amount 
of loss sustained by the victim.197 For white collar offenses, such increases 
often make the difference between a relatively moderate and a very long 
sentence. And federal law requires that, for all crimes, details about the 
harm that the defendant inflicted on the victim be included in presentence 
reports—the documents that usually form the factual basis of a judge’s 
sentencing determination.198 
The additional victim harm associated with non-stranger crimes takes 
two forms: (a) a greater likelihood of serious physical injury during the 
violent incident, and (b) non-physical harm unique to close personal 
relationships. Several studies have shown that violent crimes committed 
by non-strangers tend to result in more serious injury to victims than 
comparable stranger crimes.199 For example, one study of robbery victims 
found that “robberies by strangers appear less likely to cause serious injury 
than robberies by acquaintances.”200 A study of felony assault arrests in 
New York City similarly found that “serious injury—that is, injury 
requiring some medical attention, stitches or hospitalization—was more 
 
 
 The doctrine of felony murder provides another example of the centrality of victim harm to 
offense seriousness. While the attempt doctrine reduces offender liability in the absence of victim 
harm, the felony murder rule increases liability on the basis of greater harm. Under the doctrine of 
felony murder, an offender whose culpability is relatively low, e.g., he intends only to rob a store, will 
be charged with the more serious crime of murder when his actions result in the loss of a life. Id. at 
435–46. 
 196. “Wholly apart from its role in the definition of crime, however, judges traditionally have 
considered a crime’s effect on its victim in deciding on a sentence.” Jessie K. Liu, Victimhood, 71 MO. 
L. REV. 115, 115 (2006). 
 197. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2006). 
 198. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (“[A presentence report must include] verified information, 
stated in a nonargumentative style, that assesses the financial, social, psychological, and medical 
impact on any individual against whom the offense has been committed.”). That requirement was 
added by the Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982). 
“Although the record of the hearings before the Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee indicates that a major reason for including this information was for purposes of 
determining restitution, the appendix to the hearings emphasizes that statements concerning the actual 
harm caused are ‘useful tools in determining equitable penalties during the sentencing of a convicted 
offender.’” Henderson, supra note 147, at 999. 
 199. “Victims of violence were more likely to report being injured when the offender was an 
intimate partner (48 percent injured) or a family member (32 percent injured) than when the offender 
was a stranger (20 percent injured).” Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “About One in Four 
Victims of Violent Crime are Physically Injured During the Offense” (June 24, 2001), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/ivc98pr.htm; see also CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 6, at 
19 (noting that studies “suggest that the injury inflicted by family members or acquaintances is likely 
to be more severe than that from strangers”). 
 200. Philip J. Cook, Robbery Violence, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 357, 362 (1987). 
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frequent in the prior relationship cases (46%) than in stranger cases 
(33%).”201 It is possible that this higher proportion of severe injury in 
cases of non-stranger violence is attributable to a bias in reporting effects, 
namely that victims are, on the whole, less likely to report a crime to law 
enforcement when they know the offender.202 Reasoning that a victim’s 
tendency to report a crime increased with the seriousness of her injury, the 
authors of these studies posited that victim reluctance to report non-
stranger violence would distort the number of reported non-stranger 
robberies as a proportion of all non-stranger robberies.203  
But there are reasons to believe that the disproportionately high number 
of non-stranger crimes that end in serious injury is attributable to more 
than just reporting bias. Another possible explanation is that robbery 
victims are more likely to resist when being robbed by an individual that 
they know as opposed to a stranger. In that case, it seems that the existing 
relationship itself plays a causal role in the injury: because the robbery 
victim knows the offender, she may be less likely to immediately perceive 
the incident as a crime and comply with the offender’s demands. An 
existing relationship may also play a causal role in non-robbery violence. 
Non-stranger violence is often driven by interpersonal conflict, and that 
conflict may significantly predate any one particular incident of 
violence.204 A study of New York City felony arrests found that, in assault 
cases, “long-standing personal conflicts were more likely to result in 
serious injury than spur-of-the-moment stranger assaults.”205 
The causal link between existing relationships and a propensity for 
serious physical injury should give us pause in assuming that non-stranger 
crime is, in general, less serious than stranger crime. Of course, as 
discussed above, the existence of physical harm is a factor that leads to 
 
 
 201. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 29; see also id. at 30 (“The higher incidence of 
serious injuries in prior relationship cases was matched by the more frequent use of weapons . . . . 
Virtually all (93%) defendants who attacked people they knew used a weapon of some kind; over half 
used a knife. But less than half (43%) of those who allegedly attacked strangers used any weapon at 
all.”). 
 202. See supra note 23. 
 203. Cook, supra note 200, at 362; VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 30. Cook also 
suggests that “robberies by acquaintances [may] involve nonpecuniary motives conducive to violence 
such as a desire to avenge a drug rip-off.” Cook, supra note 200, at 362. 
 204. See NIGEL G. FIELDING, COURTING VIOLENCE: OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON CASES IN 
COURT 113 (2006) (“Violence is often between parties known to one another, and may be an episode 
in a series of frictions.”). Cf. MANN, supra note 178, at 20 (“[Disputes in ongoing personal 
relationships can be] particularly nasty precisely because the personal relations are close and frequent. 
The informal multiplicity of social ties may, in fact, leave law as the only vehicle available to the 
parties to resolve their differences”). 
 205. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 135. 
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higher prioritization for both stranger and non-stranger violence.206 Thus, 
in specific cases where a personal relationship results in more serious 
physical injury to the victim, the existence of greater physical injury may 
result in more serious treatment of that specific case. 
But non-stranger violent crimes are often accompanied by unique, non-
physical harms that are unlikely to garner the same criminal justice 
attention as physical injury. Victims of non-stranger violence are likely to 
feel guilt or confusion about the violent incident.207 In the case of stranger 
violence, the victim knows that the violence was a random event. By 
contrast, the non-stranger victim may wonder what she did to precipitate 
the violence, and thus end up feeling angry not only at the offender, but 
also at herself.208 
Victims of non-stranger violence are also likely to experience 
additional non-physical harm associated with the fear of future violence or 
reprisal. A 1977 study of victims in Brooklyn Criminal Court found that 
victims who knew their offender tended “to be more afraid that the 
defendant would seek revenge against them.” The study appeared to 
confirm those fears, finding that “29% of these victims, compared to 11% 
of other victims were threatened by the defendant at some point during 
their court case.”209 The Brooklyn Criminal Court study also revealed that 
victims of non-stranger violent crimes were “more likely to report 
emotional problems” stemming from the crime.210 A higher incident of 
emotional problems stemming from non-stranger violence is not surprising 
because “[v]ictimization at the hands of an acquaintance [is] not a discrete 
experience bound in space and time, but a continuing source of stress 
 
 
 206. See supra notes 37–38. 
 207. For example, victims of non-stranger rape sometimes believe that they were responsible for 
the offense. See, e.g., Allison West, Tougher Prosecution When the Rapist is not a Stranger: 
Suggested Reform to the California Penal Code, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 169, 178 (1994). And 
because victims may not be able to treat the incident purely as a crime, they may fail to seek 
counseling or other help. See id. at 174 n.13.  
 208. A 1977 study of victims in Brooklyn Criminal Court revealed that “victims who knew the 
offender tended . . . to be angrier at themselves for their victimization . . . .” Davis & Smith, supra note 
107, at 178; see also West, supra note 207, at 178 (“One of the discernable differences between 
nonstranger rape and stranger rape is that the randomness of the crime is absent. Numerous types of 
crimes are inflicted indiscriminately upon people who find themselves the victims of bad timing or 
unusual circumstances. In these instances, the mere randomness of the crime can assuage feelings of 
guilt or personal attack and vulnerability.”). 
 209. Davis & Smith, supra note 107, at 178. 
 210. Id. at 178–79. The study revealed a similar and more significant pattern for property crime. 
Id. 
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because the victims kn[o]w that they might very well encounter the 
defendant in the future.”211 
In addition to these greater feelings of fear or stress, people who are 
victimized by individuals with whom they have a close personal 
relationship are also likely to experience a sense of violation of trust.212 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines currently increase sentences for 
individuals who use a “position of public or private trust” to commit a 
crime.213 But the Guidelines limit this provision to offenders who hold 
“professional or managerial” positions in relation to their victims.214 While 
some professional relationships—such as attorney-client or doctor-
patient—certainly give rise to an expectation of trust that the state should 
encourage, so too do certain personal relationships, such as husband-wife 
and parent-child.215 The same rationale that supports the designation of a 
breach of professional trust as an aggravating factor at sentencing also 
supports similar treatment for breach of trust based on marriage and other 
familial relationships.216 
B. Equalizing Positive and Negative Obligations 
Society imposes on all of its members certain negative obligations—
that is, obligations to refrain from certain conduct. Close personal 
relationships also create positive obligations—that is, obligations to 
affirmatively perform tasks. These positive obligations are recognized 
social norms and are enshrined in modern laws. Treating stranger violence 
 
 
 211. Davis & Smith, supra note 107, at 178–79. 
 212. See Simon, Sex Offender Legislation, supra note 6, at 493–94 (“Family offenses such as child 
sexual abuse . . . caus[e] victims irreparable harm due to the betrayal of a trusted relationship.”). 
 213. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2006) (“If the defendant abused a position 
of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the 
commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels.”). 
 214. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2006) (“‘Public or private trust’ 
refers to a position of public or private trust characterized by professional or managerial discretion 
(i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference).”). Other 
jurisdictions do not appear to have such limitations. For example, California considers whether “[t]he 
defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense” to be an 
aggravating factor for all crimes. CAL. R. CT. 4.421(a)(11). 
 215. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital 
Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 S.M.U. L. REV. 1507, 1542 (1996) (arguing that “[a]ll 
domestic violence exploits the vulnerability and trust which accompany intimacy”). 
 216. See ONTARIO WOMEN’S DIRECTORATE, BREACH OF TRUST IN SEXUAL ASSAULT: 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 3 (1992) (noting that in sexual assault cases “judges often fail to 
recognize a breach of trust, although it is a standard aggravating factor in sentencing guidelines,” and 
that in cases where the offender is “a father; paternal figure (e.g., the mother’s common-law partner); 
relative of the victim; friend of child victim’s parent, or parent of the child victim’s friend . . . a trust 
relationship may be presumed to exist”). 
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as more serious than violence occurring within close personal relationships 
is in tension with this system of positive obligations. Just as close personal 
relationships create positive obligations, they should also mandate strict 
observance of negative obligations. 
Marriage and filial relationships both give rise to legally enforceable 
obligations. At common law, a man had a duty to financially support his 
wife.217 Nowadays the obligations of support apply to both spouses: “most 
states have enacted a variety of family expense statutes that codify the 
spousal duty of support and statutes that impose criminal sanctions for 
non-support. Family expenses and criminal non-support statutes also apply 
to an equal, and sometimes greater, extent to child support.”218 Like the bi-
directional duty of spousal support, some states have enacted statutes that 
require adult children to support their elderly parents.219 
Financial duties are not the only positive obligations within families. 
Parents have the obligation to provide their children with certain 
necessities (e.g., food, water, and medical care), the obligation to supervise 
their children, and the obligation to intervene to protect their children from 
abuse or neglect by another.220 While an individual ordinarily has no legal 
duty to come to the aid of another citizen, a parent can be found criminally 
liable for failing to perform these obligations.221 
Other close personal relationships, such as those between siblings and 
close friends, may also create positive legal obligations. In Texas, for 
example, courts have held that a close, personal relationship may give rise 
 
 
 217. That obligation could be enforced by the wife. See Robert Coleman Brown, The Duty of the 
Husband to Support the Wife, 18 VA. L. REV. 823, 846–47 (1932) (noting that courts permitted a 
“direct action by the wife to have support decreed to her” without requiring her to first seek a divorce 
or a judicial separation, but the wife did have to show justification for living apart from her husband). 
Alternatively, the obligation could be enforced by third parties who had sold necessary goods to the 
wife. See id. at 843 (“The conception of the common law judges was that the duty [of a husband to 
support his wife] was to be enforced through the merchants or other outside parties who have 
furnished the wife with necessities.”); JOHN DE WITT GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER & SHERYL L. 
WOLF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 3.10 (3d ed. 2005) (“[Under the doctrine of necessaries] the 
wife and children could purchase any essential goods or services, including food, clothing, shelter, and 
medical and legal services, on the husband’s credit and the husband became directly liable to the 
provider of these necessary items. Unlike agency law principles, the doctrine of necessaries held the 
husband responsible regardless of his consent to, or knowledge of, the purchases”). 
 218. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 217, § 3.12. 
 219. A “majority of states have enacted relative responsibility statutes . . . requiring adult children 
to contribute to the support of needy parent. Some states also have statutes that create a crime of 
failure to support a parent in need.” GREGORY ET AL., supra note 217, § 3.14; see also Ann Britton, 
America’s Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child’s Duty to Support Aged Parents, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 351 
(1990); Walton Garrett, Filial Responsibility Laws, 28 J. FAM. L. 793 (1980). 
 220. Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting Negligent 
Parents, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 807, 818 (2006). 
 221. Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 109–10 (1993). 
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to an “informal” fiduciary relationship.222 Similarly, some (though not all) 
courts have held that “friendship may be a relevant factor in establishing a 
party’s right to rely on representations” or in assessing a duty to deal 
fairly.223 
There is an inherent conflict between positive and negative obligations 
in a regime that treats stranger violence more seriously than violence in 
close personal relationships. For example, a mother who strikes and kills 
her child may receive a lighter sentence than a stranger who strikes and 
kills a child. If, however, the mother watched the stranger strike and kill 
her child, and if she did nothing to protect the child, both she and the 
stranger would be punished: the stranger would be punished for killing the 
child, and the mother would be punished for failing to protect her child. A 
regime that punishes more harshly the stranger who kills the child than the 
mother who kills the child attaches less value to the mother’s negative 
obligation not to harm the child than to the stranger’s negative obligation 
not to harm the child. And such a regime completely fails to account for 
the mother’s positive obligation to protect her child. The stranger has a 
duty not to hurt the child, while the mother has both an obligation not to 
hurt the child and an obligation to protect him. 
C. Strengthening Weaker Norms 
From a utilitarian perspective, more severe treatment of non-stranger 
violence may be necessary in order to compensate for weaker moral norms 
against non-stranger violence as opposed to stranger violence. Those 
weaker norms are particularly evident in comparing the treatment by 
criminal justice actors of acquaintance or date rape to rape by a stranger. 
Police and prosecutors are more hesitant to pursue the former than the 
latter,224 and judges and juries are reluctant to convict and punish rapists 
when the victim’s behavior might have somehow contributed to the 
offender’s decision to rape.225 The trend is not limited to rape. 
 
 
 222. See, e.g., Holland v. Lesesne, 350 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (holding that the close 
personal, friendly, and confidential relation between the parties and their families, which visited each 
other regularly, dined together, and vacationed together, constituted a fiduciary relationship and was 
sufficient to impress constructive trust in view of an oral agreement between the parties); see also Roy 
Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the Campfire: Understanding Confidential Relationships, 53 S.M.U. L. 
REV. 315, 344–52 (2000). 
 223. See Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 689 (2007). 
 224. West, supra note 207, at 184–85.  
 225. See id. at 186 n.57 (recounting the sentencing decision of a judge to sentence a rapist to 
probation in a rape case where the victim and offender were friends: “Analogizing the matter to a 
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Prosecutions and convictions are proportionally fewer for non-stranger 
violent crimes across the board.226 
Any consistent use of discretion by criminal justice decision makers to 
treat non-stranger violence less seriously than stranger violence likely 
reflects not only determinations about specific cases, but also a more 
generally held view that stranger violence is, in some way, worse than 
non-stranger violence.227 Treating violence within relationships just as 
seriously as violence between strangers will reinforce the message that 
non-stranger violence is entirely unacceptable behavior. Because social 
norms are some of the most effective deterrents of criminal behavior,228 
the success of this message is essential to preventing non-stranger 
violence, and thus to decreasing levels of violent crime generally. As the 
English jurist James Fitzjames Stephen famously remarked: 
Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that, if 
they committed murder, they would be hung. Hundreds of 
thousands abstain from it because they regard it with horror. One 
great reason why they regard it with horror is that murderers are 
hung with the hearty approbation of all reasonable men.229 
To combat prevailing norms that appear to trivialize non-stranger 
violence, some jurisdictions have elected to remove discretion from 
decision makers. The most obvious examples of the removal of discretion 
are the mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies for domestic 
violence. These policies remove discretion not only from police and 
prosecutors, but also from domestic violence victims.230 Although it is not 
clear whether the elimination of discretion is necessary to effect a change 
 
 
property claim, the judge said, ‘if I grab your purse, its robbery, but if you leave your pocketbook on 
the bench and I take it, its larceny, which is less serious’”). 
 226. See supra note 28. 
 227. I use the word “worse” here to include many of the justifications discussed supra in Part II—
e.g., stranger offenders are more culpable, more dangerous, and more likely to inspire public fear. 
 228. See Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1187–90 (2004); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and 
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 354 (1997) (“Empirical studies of why people obey the law . . . reveal 
a strong correlation between a person’s obedience and her perception of others’ behavior and attitudes 
toward the law. . . . [T]he perception that one’s peers will or will not disapprove exerts a much 
stronger influence than does the threat of a formal sanction on whether a person decides to engage in a 
range of common offenses.”). 
 229. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 
(1863), quoted in Meares et al., supra note 228, at 1183. 
 230. See Developments in the Law, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1498, 1535–43 (1993). 
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in the social norms about domestic violence, there is evidence that those 
norms are beginning to change.231  
While changing social norms is likely to require some formal legal 
response,232 a legal rule itself may not be sufficient to effectuate change. 
To the contrary, legal rules that are too dissimilar to public sentiment are 
likely to be circumvented.233 For example, each of the fifty states has some 
form of legislation that treats domestic violence more seriously than non-
domestic assaults.234 Yet, recent statistics indicate that those offenders 
 
 
 231. See Elliott, supra note 28, at 473 (“The past decade has witnessed a dramatic shift in public 
attitudes and orientations toward family violence: a shift from a policy of indifference to one of 
control, in which legal remedies are more frequently invoked in an attempt to deter this form of 
violence, provide better protection for victims, and facilitate positive changes in family 
relationships.”); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L. J. 2, 6 (2006) (“The 
recognition of domestic violence (‘DV’) as a public issue is manifest in law reform aimed at reshaping 
law enforcement officials’ response so that they treat DV as a crime.”). 
 232. Cf. Hotaling et al., supra note 38, at 317 (noting that the previous “lack of response of the 
legal system, in turn, reinforced the view that family violence is not a crime”). 
 233. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000) (“If the law condemns the conduct substantially more than does the 
typical decisionmaker, the decisionmaker’s personal aversion to condemning too severely will 
dominate her inclination to enforce the law, and she will balk. Her reluctance to enforce, moreover, 
will strengthen the resistance of other decisionmakers, whose reluctance will steel the resolve of still 
others, triggering a self-reinforcing wave of resistance.”); Meares et al., supra note 228, at 1185 
(noting that high penalties may “create what may be termed an inverse sentencing effect. High 
penalties, instead of increasing conviction rates, may decrease them. As penalties increase, people may 
not be as willing to enforce them because of the disproportionate impact on those caught”). 
 234. Some states create a separate domestic abuse offense, which sometimes (but not always) 
carries an additional penalty or at least a mandatory minimum of prison time. Compare ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-6-20 (2005), with id. at § 13A-6-130; compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(a) (Deering Supp. 
2007), with id. at § 243(e)(1); compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-201 (2005), with id. at § 45-5-206; 
compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-4 (West Supp. 2007), with id. at § 30-3-15; compare VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13, § 1023 (2006), with id. at § 1042. See also COLO. REV. STAT. §18-6-801 (2006); FLA. 
STAT. § 741.283 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-20, 16-5-21, 16-5-23, 16-5-24 (2006); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-33 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 644 (West Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
253.2 (Supp. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99.080 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-501 (2007). 
Sometimes special enhanced penalties for repeat offenses are imposed on domestic assaults. E.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(M) (2006–2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-801(7) (2006); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-918(3) (2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-3.2 (West Supp. 2007); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-42-2-1.3 (West Supp. 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.2A (West Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-3412(a) (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.032 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:35.3 (Supp. 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.81a (West Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE. ANN. 
§ 97-3-7 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-01 (Supp. 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.160 (2005); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 12-29-5 (Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-65 (Supp. 2007); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1.1 (Supp. 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 61-2-28 (Supp. 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-501 (2007). And some states criminalize the 
violation of domestic violence protective orders and simply tack on that penalty to whatever is 
normally imposed for the underlying assault. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.130 (2006); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 46b-15 (2007); 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1046 (Supp. 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 586-11 (LexisNexis 2005); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/223(g) (Supp. 2007); IOWA CODE § 236.8 
(Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 19-A § 4011 (Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 4-509 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 343 Hessick book pages.doc1/11/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
400 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:343 
 
 
 
 
who assault family members receive significantly less punishment than 
those who assault non-family members.235 In order to avoid such 
circumvention in cases of non-stranger violence,236 several intermediate 
steps may be required to ensure more serious treatment of non-stranger 
violence.237 Steps may also need to be taken outside of the traditional 
criminal justice model in order to affect prevailing social norms.238 
However, without corresponding changes in criminal justice decisions—
that is, so long as criminal justice decision makers continue to prioritize 
stranger violence above non-stranger violence—norms against non-
stranger violence are likely to remain relatively weak. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The preceding pages of this Article have discussed why stranger 
violence should not be treated as more serious than non-stranger violence. 
While there are likely a not-insignificant number of non-stranger crimes 
where the offender is less culpable or less dangerous than other offenders, 
those determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis. Criminal 
justice decision makers should err on the side of caution when making 
such a determination, remembering that any decision to treat non-stranger 
violence more leniently includes a moral judgment that the offender’s 
anger was understandable.239 
 
 
(West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13A (Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 
(West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.085 (West Supp. 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-924 
(LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:9 (Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-9 (West 
2005); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 846 (McKinney Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.27 (West 
2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-13 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-612 (2005); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 813.12 (West 2007). So, while nearly every state, at least according to statute, treats domestic 
violence more harshly than conventional assault, there often needs to be a protective order violation or 
a repeat offense for the overall punishment to be enhanced. 
 235. 13.7% of family assault offenders and 18.7% of nonfamily assault offenders received 
sentences of nonincarceration. 58.9% of family assault offenders and 30.6% of nonfamily assault 
offenders were sentenced to jail. 27.4% of family assault offenders and 50.7% of nonfamily assault 
offenders were sentenced to prison. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 50, tbl.6.13. 
 236. Cf. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 55 (quoting a New York City ADA as saying 
“juries will not convict on first degree murder unless it’s a gangland premeditated murder—they hand 
down first degree manslaughter convictions instead, particularly where the crime is committed in the 
heat of passion”). 
 237. See Kahan, supra note 233, at 610–11 (“If the lawmaker selects a sufficiently mild degree of 
severity . . . then a majority of decisionmakers will enforce the law at the outset. This condition, too, 
will reinforce itself. As members of society are exposed to consistent and conspicuous instances of 
enforcement, they will revise upward their judgment of the degree of condemnation warranted by the 
conduct in question. Accordingly, over time, the percentage of decisionmakers willing to enforce the 
existing law will grow.”). 
 238. See, e.g., infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
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This Part summarizes the reasons underlying my conclusion that equal 
treatment of stranger and non-stranger violence is appropriate. It then 
briefly explores the implications of that conclusion, sketching what equal 
treatment of stranger and non-stranger violence would entail in light of the 
practical differences between the two types of violence. 
A. Explaining the Equality Recommendation 
As explained above, the justifications for treating stranger violence 
more seriously than non-stranger violence are much weaker than they 
originally appear,240 and there are reasons to treat violence in close 
relationships more seriously than violence between strangers.241 In light of 
these observations, one might suppose that the logical inference to draw is 
that non-stranger violence should be treated more seriously than stranger 
violence. But this Article espouses equal treatment instead. 
There is at least some empirical support for the assumption that, as a 
group, stranger offenders pose a greater danger of reoffending and a 
greater danger to a larger number of people than non-stranger offenders.242 
A higher recidivism rate of some stranger offenders would arguably 
support harsher treatment under an incapacitation rationale for 
punishment. There is no doubt that incapacitation is a legitimate 
justification for punishment decisions—indeed it has been deemed 
sufficient to justify significant punishment variations.243 But incapacitation 
certainly is not the only purpose of punishment. Part III identifies strong 
reasons to conclude that some non-stranger violence—specifically, the 
violence that occurs within close personal relationships—is more 
blameworthy (and thus more deserving of punishment under the 
retributive theory of punishment) than stranger violence. 
When different punishment theories suggest different punishment 
outcomes, it is not clear how best to resolve the conflict. The purposes 
themselves—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
incorporate different concerns.244 Several commentators have expressed 
 
 
 240. See supra Part II. 
 241. See supra Part III. 
 242. See discussion supra in Part II.B. 
 243. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30, 31–32 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 244. Justice Scalia alluded to this problem in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991): 
[E]ven if “similarly grave” crimes could be identified, the penalties for them would not 
necessarily be comparable, since there are many other justifications for a difference. For 
example, since deterrent effect depends not only upon the amount of the penalty but upon its 
certainty, crimes that are less grave but significantly more difficult to detect may warrant 
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the opinion that retribution should limit, if not largely determine, 
punishment decisions.245 But, even were we generally to accord greater 
weight to retributive concerns, that would not necessarily imply that the 
heightened retributive concerns regarding non-stranger offenders 
identified above justify the treatment of non-stranger offenders (even 
offenders in close personal relationships with their victims) as more 
serious than stranger offenders. That is because where, as here, conflicting 
punishment purposes are as different as incapacitation and retribution, any 
attempt to balance those purposes would be akin to attempting to judge 
“whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”246 
Given the difficulties in balancing these very different punishment 
purposes, this Article concludes that stranger and non-stranger violence 
should be treated equally. This solution not only avoids the difficulties 
inherent in attempting to balance the various punishment purposes, but 
also has the benefit of promoting the independent value of equality in 
criminal punishment.247 While different levels of concern with respect to 
either incapacitation or retribution would almost certainly justify different 
levels of punishment, where the differences between offenders are weak, 
as they are here, equal treatment promotes the perception of fairness. 
B. Confronting Practical Differences Between Stranger and Non-stranger 
Violence 
While this Article aims only to test whether more serious treatment of 
stranger violence relative to non-stranger violence can be justified, a few 
 
 
substantially higher penalties. Grave crimes of the sort that will not be deterred by penalty 
may warrant substantially lower penalties, as may grave crimes of the sort that are normally 
committed once in a lifetime by otherwise law-abiding citizens who will not profit from 
rehabilitation. Whether these differences will occur, and to what extent, depends, of course, 
upon the weight the society accords to deterrence and rehabilitation, rather than retribution, as 
the objective of criminal punishment . . . . In fact, it becomes difficult even to speak 
intelligently of “proportionality,” once deterrence and rehabilitation are given significant 
weight. Proportionality is inherently a retributive concept . . . . 
(Although Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in Harmelin, only Chief Justice Rehnquist 
joined the portion of the opinion that included this observation.) 
 245. See generally NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); ANDREW VON 
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES (1985). 
 246. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Having evaluated the interests on both sides as roughly as this, the Court 
then proceeds to judge which is more important. This process is ordinarily called ‘balancing,’ but the 
scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more 
like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 247. See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text. 
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brief words are necessary about how to develop policies to treat non-
stranger and stranger violence equally in light of the practical differences 
between the two. Those practical differences include differing levels of 
victim cooperation and the relative effectiveness of traditional crime 
prevention measures. 
Any current deficiency in prosecution rates is likely attributable, at 
least in part, to victims’ hesitancy to pursue criminal charges against a 
close friend or family member. Victims of non-stranger violence appear to 
be less likely to cooperate―especially when they have a close personal 
relationship with the offender―than victims of stranger violence.248 
Prosecutor interviews conducted as part of a 1970s study of felony arrests 
in New York City revealed that prosecutors often dismissed non-stranger 
cases because of “lack of cooperation by the complainant.”249 But there is 
some evidence that prosecutors act differently when faced with a lack of 
cooperation from stranger victims. A study of Brooklyn Criminal Court 
found that in non-stranger cases when victims were uncooperative, the 
prosecutor dismissed 61% of the time; in stranger cases when victims were 
uncooperative, the dismissal rate was only 37%.250 And in cases where the 
complainant never showed up in court, prosecutors were far more likely to 
dismiss non-stranger cases than stranger cases: “41% of relationship cases 
in which the complainant never appeared were dismissed, compared to 
only 14% of stranger-to-stranger cases in which the complainant never 
appeared.”251 Studies have also revealed that prosecutors were far more 
likely to consult non-stranger victims about their wishes than stranger 
victims.252 
 
 
 248. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that “[d]ismissal because of 
complainant non-cooperation appears less likely to occur when the prior relationship is a business, 
rather than a personal, one”). 
 249. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 20 (“The most frequently cited reason for dismissal 
in prior relationship cases was lack of cooperation by the complainant.”); see also supra notes 23–26 
and accompanying text. 
 250. Davis & Smith, supra note 107, at 182. “When victims did cooperate, however, the dismissal 
rate for relationship and non-relationship cases was an identical 23%.” Id. 
 251. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 3 (citing an additional study which “found that in 
instances in which complainants are absent from court on a particular date, relationship cases are less 
likely to be continued, and more likely to be dismissed on that date than stranger-to-stranger cases”). A 
similar pattern of prosecutorial explanations for dismissing more non-stranger cases than stranger 
cases was uncovered in a study of criminal cases in which felony charges were initially filed in Alaska 
between 1974 and 1976. That study revealed that strength of evidence made a difference in decisions 
whether to dismiss charges in non-stranger crimes—that is, a case was more likely to be dismissed if 
the evidence against the offender was not particularly strong—but strength of evidence did not have a 
similar effect in stranger cases. Miethe, supra note 69, at 584. 
 252. “[V]ictims who knew the defendant were much more likely than other victims to be 
consulted by prosecutors about their wishes; in 52% of relationship cases observed, victims were 
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To combat the lack of victim cooperation some jurisdictions have 
experimented with various policies and practices. In domestic violence 
cases, for example, some jurisdictions have instituted mandatory arrest 
policies, “no drop” policies (under which the case is prosecuted even 
against the victim’s wishes), or pretrial diversion programs (which allow 
the offender to avoid punishment, provided he does not reoffend within a 
certain time period).253 
Some commentators have supported these policies,254 while others 
have not.255 Arguments in favor of these policies include that it is 
necessary, at least in the short term, to institute such policies in order to 
protect domestic violence victims while changing enforcement norms.256 
Arguments against these policies include that it undermines the victim’s 
autonomy to prosecute a case that she does not wish to pursue.257 Both of 
these positions suffer the same shortcoming: they frame the issue of non-
stranger violence prosecutions only in terms of the victims’ interests. The 
reasons for punishing the non-stranger offender should not neglect the 
reasons for punishing the stranger offender or the offender who commits a 
victimless crime―that is, in breaking a law, the offender has done 
something that is worthy of punishment.258 Punishment not only gives the 
offender what he deserves, it also expresses the public’s moral 
condemnation of his actions.259 
In addition to ignoring the desert purposes and expressive content of 
punishment, a system that defers to victim wishes may have unintended 
 
 
consulted, compared to only four percent of stranger-to-stranger cases.” Davis & Smith, supra note 
107, at 182; see also NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 4 (noting that these findings are 
consistent with a sample from a study in Suffolk County, New York). 
 253. See Developments in the Law, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1498, 1535–43 (1993). 
 254. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996). 
  255. See, e.g., Jessica Dayton, The Silencing of a Woman’s Choice: Mandatory Arrest and No 
Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 281 (2002); 
Gruber, supra note 175. 
 256. See, e.g., Machaela M. Hoctor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need 
for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 648 (1997) (arguing that mandatory arrest 
laws are necessary “to provide adequate protection to all victims of domestic violence”). 
 257. See, e.g., Carol Wright, Note, Immediate Arrest In Domestic Violence Situations: Mandate or 
Alternative, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 243, 260 (1985) (noting that mandatory arrest laws take decision 
making power away from victims and can possibly force them to prosecute against their wishes). 
 258. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCINGS: 
READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 201 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998). 
 259. In punishing the wrongdoer, society expresses its view that the offender’s actions are wrong, 
and the amount of punishment that society inflicts reflects the “judgment of ‘how bad’ the offence 
was” by translating that judgment into the particular amount of punishment. ANDREW ASHWORTH, 
SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 61 (3d ed. 2000). 
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negative consequences. For example, if a domestic violence victim 
believes that it is her decision whether to continue the prosecution of her 
loved one, she may experience feelings of doubt or guilt at the end of a 
successful prosecution. And the perception that a victim can end a 
prosecution may result in pressure on the victim―not only from the 
offender, but also from other friends or family members―to have the 
charges dropped. 
This is not to say that a victim’s interests or wishes should never shape 
enforcement decisions. But decisions about how to incorporate victim 
wishes into enforcement efforts should use the same criteria, without 
regard to preexisting relationships between victim and offender. And to 
the extent that victim cooperation remains a significant problem in non-
stranger cases, it may be appropriate to address these issues outside the 
context of the decision whether to prosecute, such as providing counseling 
or other support services to victims.260 
Equalizing enforcement levels is likely necessary, but not sufficient, to 
prevent non-stranger violence. Many crimes by family members and 
friends are never reported,261 and arrests do not necessarily lead to 
convictions. Successful prosecutions and lengthy criminal sentences do 
not, standing alone, appear actually to deter crime.262 Changes to crime 
prevention policies are likely also necessary in order to actually reduce 
non-stranger crime levels.  
Today’s crime prevention policies focus primarily on issues such as 
police presence on the street and get-tough policies on drug crime.263 
Unlike stranger violence, much non-stranger violence occurs in secluded 
locations, such as the victims’ homes, rather than in public.264 Thus, 
 
 
 260. “A number of cities have established special family violence prosecution units and family 
victim/witness assistance programs to deal with these victim-related problems. [There are] a number of 
federally funded programs with mandates to encourage and coordinate the efforts of police, 
prosecutors, and community agencies and to provide additional services such as shelters, special 
prosecution units, mental health clinics, protection order clinics, and educational and training 
programs.” Elliott, supra note 28, at 464. 
 261. See supra note 23. 
 262. See supra note 228. 
 263. See, e.g., Steven Duke, Clinton and Crime, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 575, 583 (1993) (“During the 
campaign, Clinton said he favored putting 100,000 new police on the street . . . . Calling for more cops 
is standard fare for any politician.”). 
 264. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 9 tbl.2.2 (reporting that 66% of 
stranger violence between 1998 and 2002 occurred in a public place or on commercial property, as 
compared to 54% of violence between friends and acquaintances, 17% between non-married intimates, 
and 8% between family members); Margaret A. Zahn & Philip C. Sagi, Stranger Homicides in Nine 
American Cities, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377, 389 (1987) (“Not unexpectedly, the percentage 
of family killings occurring at home was higher (78%) than with other types of killings. The 
percentage of killings occurring in public settings increased as the relationship between the victim and 
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traditional crime prevention methods may not be sufficient to combat the 
unique challenges presented by non-stranger crime. 
Some jurisdictions have begun to experiment with non-traditional 
crime prevention and crime resolution methods. These non-traditional 
methods, often collectively referred to as community justice measures, 
include community prosecution, community courts, sentencing circles, and 
citizen reparative boards. Each of these methods differ in important 
respects, but all share the common goal of “eliminating local situations 
that encourage crime, compensating the victim and victimized community, 
and rehabilitating the offender rather than inflicting punishment.”265 For 
example, the state of Arizona recently piloted a program called “The 
Impact of Crime on Victims,” the goal of which is “to show inmates the 
impact of their crimes and to help them see the consequences from a 
victim’s perspective.”266 The ten week class for prisoners includes 
presentations by victims and victims’ families that are intended to teach 
inmates “to appreciate that their conduct has had a profound impact on 
others.”267 The city of Milwaukee has launched a separate program that 
does not resemble traditional crime control or dispute resolution at all. In 
Milwaukee the “homicide review commission has frequent, formal 
meetings with corrections officers, prosecutors and social service agencies 
to identify problem families, and is meeting with schools to assess what 
they are teaching about conflict resolution and how to reduce truancy.”268 
While the efficacy of these programs is still largely unknown, they offer 
an alternative to traditional crime control methods that could be employed 
for both non-stranger and stranger violence. 
Whatever policies are pursued in order to address the unique crime 
prevention problems associated with non-stranger violence, it is important 
that non-stranger violence be treated as a serious crime. Because non-
 
 
the offender became more distant. The stranger non-felony homicide is clearly the most public 
homicide type, with 85% of these killings occurring in a public space.”); see also NSW BUREAU OF 
CRIME STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, FAMILY, ACQUAINTANCE AND STRANGER HOMICIDE IN NEW 
SOUTH WALES 16 (1992); Robert A. Silverman & Leslie W. Kennedy, Relational Distance and 
Homicide: The Role of the Stranger, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 272, 302 (1987). 
 265. Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 368 
(2005).  
 266. Judi Villa, Victims’ Perspectives Connect with Prisoners: Program Puts Face on Crime’s 
Toll, Attempts to Repair Harm, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.azcentral. 
com/news/articles/1007victims1007.html#. 
 267. Id. For a discussion of other, similar programs, see Marilyn Peterson Armour et al., Bridges 
to Life: Evaluation of an In-Prison Restorative Justice Intervention, 24 MED. & L. 831, 832–35 
(2005). 
 268. Kate Zernike, Violent Crime Rising Sharply in Some Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at 
A1, available at 2006 WLNR 2438193. 
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stranger violence is often perceived as a problem between a particular 
offender and a particular victim, criminal justice decision makers may see 
their primary goal as protecting the particular victim from future violence, 
rather than pursuing a criminal case against the offender.269 Protecting 
victims against future violence is certainly an important criminal justice 
goal, but the expressive and deterrent value of criminal sanctions should 
not be neglected. Criminal penalties “send out ‘messages’ to members of 
society, and these messages exert a moral influence that inculcates social 
norms.”270 Taking non-stranger violence seriously as crime will help to 
protect those who have already been the victim of non-stranger violence, 
and it may also decrease future non-stranger violence. 
 
 
 269. Indeed, there are reasons to suspect that this view affects a victim’s decision to pursue 
criminal charges. As Elliott tells us: 
In a majority of cases dropped, the victim’s reasons were consistent with their stated desired 
outcome at the time of filing: they believed they had been successful in obtaining agreements 
from their mates that they considered satisfactory. This typically involved using the leverage 
of prosecution to control the violence so they could remain in the relationship or to obtain 
agreements allowing them to leave the relationship on terms more acceptable than had they 
not threatened prosecution. 
Elliott, supra note 28, at 465 (discussing the results of a study conducted in Indiana in 1981). The 
traditional lack of cooperation by non-stranger victims may make the goal of protection seem more 
important and more attractive because it is easier to achieve than prosecutions. See Suk, supra note 
231, at 18–19 (“Prosecutions for protection order violations can be a way of short-circuiting proof 
problems for the prosecution, and thus a more efficient and effective means of convicting and 
punishing domestic abusers. A violation of a protection order is far easier to prove than the target 
crime of DV. The testimony of the victim is generally less important. No physical injury need be 
shown. The existence of the protection order and the defendant’s presence in the home, to which the 
arresting officer can usually bear witness, are sufficient to establish violation of the protection order.”). 
 270. Meares et al., supra note 228, at 1182–83 (citing generally JOHANNES ANDENAES, 
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974)). 
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